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1. Introduction
In 1884, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a damage claim on a patented mop
head improvement for failure to apportion profits attributable to the patented
feature against the entire mop.' 130 years later, jurists deal with the same core
challenge of damage apportionment except with much more complicated prod-
ucts.2 Given the fact that as many as 250,000 patents impact the average con-
sumer smart phone, 3 can anyone say confidently that any single one of these
1Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884).
2Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable Royalty Damages, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 657
(2014) ("However, with the advent of complicated multi-component products, apportionment has made a come-
back.").
3 Mike Masnick, There Are 250,000 Active Patents that Impact Smartphones; Representing One in Six Active Patents
Today, TECHDIRT (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:28 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20121017/
10480520734/there-are-250000-active-patents- that- impact-smartphones-representing- one- six-active- patents-
today.shtml. See original research in RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/dsl.htm#toc226103_11.
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patents drives consumer demand for the whole product or even for any partic-
ular feature of the product?4 And if not, how much worth does any one patent
have in relation to the value of the entire product? For example, what portion
of the sales price of an iPhone is attributable to a particular individual feature
of that phone, such as the ability to use FaceTime? 5
There is no more important set of issues in this era of high tech patent wars,
where billions turn on the value of specific infringing features, than apportion-
ment of damages. The paramount issues are three-fold: (1) Patent law requires
a calculation of profits attributable to infringement; (2) conventional doctrine
holds that it is de rigueur to do this via consumer damage surveys (absent di-
rectly relevant and compelling comparables); and (3) controversy continues to
swirl regarding what constitutes a valid consumer demand survey.6
This article addresses this critical question of consumer demand surveys.
The article argues that the law should always require rigorous apportionment
of value based on scientifically-accepted standards of consumer demand mea-
surement. Further, the article discusses how best to achieve this policy goal
and how courts have approached it to date. This article then walks through
the pertinent case law on apportionment, the role and defensibility of survey
evidence, and offers guidance on proper survey design.
Patent courts have cut back on previously favored general rules,7 preferring
to resolve these damage issues through apportionment-a process of isolating
and valuing individual patented features of a multi-feature product, which
may include other patented and non-patented components.8 To conduct the
value apportionment analysis, courts increasingly rely on quantitative data
from consumer surveys that attempt to measure consumer demand and hence
relative economic value for the patented features at issue.9
Designing a scientifically reliable survey to measure consumer demand for
patented product features has become a challenging undertaking. And rarely
is it clear if the patent has any validity or fair use protection, especially with the
growing legal cloud on the appropriate analysis for determining the validity
of software patents.10 In the past decade, courts have limited the applicabil-
ity of general rules for the value apportionment analysis, turning instead to
4 Masnick, supra note 3.
sVirnetX v. Cisco, 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
6Order Denying Motion to Exclude, Sentius Int'l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-CV-00825-PSG, 2015 WL
331939, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23,2015) ("Long a staple of trademark, false advertising and antitrust cases, consumer
surveys are now de rigueur in patent cases as well. Unlike some of the more esoteric tools used in such cases,
surveys are not exactly unusual or unfamiliar to the layperson.").
7 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding the 25% rule of thumb
"fundamentally flawed" in determining royalty rates).
8See also Ann Armstrong et al., The Smartphone Royalty Stack, WILMERHALE (2014), available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-
Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf.
9Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd, No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 7496140, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
27, 2014) (Injunction Order) ("To show that consumers value the infringing features, Apple relies on a conjoint
study from Dr. Hauser and faults Samsung for not offering comparable survey data of its own.").
10See, e.g., Alice v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). See also Nick Wingfield & Quentin Hardy, Google Prevails
as Jury Rebuffs Oracle in Code Copyright Case, New York Times (May 26, 2016), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/27/technology/google-oracle-copyright-code.htnl" (describing the jury's fair use verdict in the
$9 billion Oracle v. Google case over Google's use of Java APIs).
bespoke, case-by-case analysis and demanding defensible, quantitative data."1
In this context, more litigants use consumer demand surveys to support their
damages arguments and in some instances to help bolster validity arguments.
This article explores the role of consumer surveys in patent litigation and the
heightened expectations of surveys in an era of an increasingly tech-savvy ju-
diciary.
In a field of law where damage claims can swing wildly throughout the
trial and appeal, establishing a reasonable royalty can be a daunting task.12
The reality is that in many patent cases, particularly software patents, no "off
the shelf" price exists that can be readily used. And courts are moving away
from hard-and-fast rules that expedite the analysis, preferring the admission
of consumer demand surveys and other forms of economic analysis. In the era
of big data, courts expect a higher level of proof.
Consumer demand surveys-when properly designed, administered, and
admitted--can play a pivotal role in the outcome of a case. In several cases,
discussed infra, courts specifically pointed to surveys, or the lack thereof, as a
substantial factor in their decision. And where one side successfully admits a
survey, it can often force the other side to develop their own survey to balance
the weight of evidence. Indeed, such survey use is already extensively relied
upon in trademark law and tends to have substantial weight.13
The challenge lies in developing a defensible consumer survey in a patent
case, given the more technical subject matter. A survey that is shot down or
otherwise successfully opposed has a tendency to negatively impact the out-
come.
14
Novel issues are coalescing as parties are forced to justify their patent roy-
alty rates with hard data. Is the patented feature even used? If so, how much
value do consumers attribute to it? Do consumers even think about product
features in this way? Is there a way to accurately determine whether, for ex-
ample, consumers would they pay 7% less for a product without that feature?
What about 5% or even 0.5%? When patents are valued in the billions, a half
percent is monolithic. And getting to that data presents another challenge in
and of itself.
This article will discuss the history and use of consumer surveys in patent
litigation, frame the current state of the law in context of recent Supreme Court
patent decisions, examine the leading survey cases, and the tactical considera-
tions in designing and using surveys in patent law. The first part of this article
sets the stage by analyzing the legal and economic theoretical foundations of
1 See discussion infra § 2-4.
1
2 See Susan Decker & Dennis Robertson, VirnetX Gets $625.6 Million in Patent Trial against Apple, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 3, 2016, 4:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-03/virnetx-gets-625-6-million-
in-patent-trial-against-apple; see also Jon Brodkin, Oracle must pay Google $1M to Cover Costs in Failed Patent
Case, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 5,2012, 10:04 AM), http:/ /arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/oracle-must-pay-
google-lm-to-cover-costs-in-failed-patent-case.
1
3 See Shari Diamond & David Franklyn, Trademark Surveys: An Undulating Path, 92 TEXAs L. REv. 2029, 2050-67
(2014) (analyzing a survey of trademark lawyers indicating that admission of survey evidence improved success
rate by 25-75%).
14 Id. at 2060-1 ("[I1n cases in which the respondent faced an opposing survey, respondents rated their own
survey as less influential than when their survey was unopposed.").
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patent surveys and why they have proven so useful in contemporary patent
law. Next, this article provides an extended study of recent cases that high-
light the challenges of software patents in particular before diving into survey
precedent. The article concludes with recommendations on how to use the
right survey tools to establish the right royalty values.
II. Law, Society, and Surveys
Multiple sea changes have occurred in patent law over this past decade.1 5 Soft-
ware patents have grown into enormous assets, with speculative values that
eclipse the GDP of most nations.16  Meanwhile, recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have called into question the very nature of software patents.'7 Volatility
remains high in the patent market; an asset valued in the billions one day can be
reduced to nothing in one fell court order.' 8 It is not clear exactly what patents
cover these days (if anything) and even more so what they are worth. The law
approaches the flashpoint, and courts are eager to use consumer surveys to
reduce the heat.
In this section, the article discusses the state of software patent law. Next,
the article addresses some of the specific technology challenges that compli-
cate damage calculations. Then the article draws a parallel to trademark law
and shows how consumer surveys are used in that field to inform damage cal-
culations.
A. Patent Laws and Software
The challenge of patent surveys is made all the more immediate by the Court's
recent Alice opinion, which invalidated a software patent and directly con-
tributed to an increase in invalidations for unpatentable subject matter.19 "Al-
ice['s] ruling could call almost all software patents into question," 20 which has
in turn led to a sort of identity crisis in both patent law and Silicon Valley, where
15 See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), available at http://www.
uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia-implementation/20110916-pub-1112-29.pdf; Jayson Sohi, Changes to the Best
Mode Requirement: Weakening Enforcement Undermines the Purpose of Patent Law and Exacerbates an Ethical "Patent
Trilemma", 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 157, 176-181 (2013) (describing some of the changes and challenges resulting
from the new AIA).
16Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Commercial Value of Software Patents in the High-Tech Industry, CENTER FOR THE
PROTECHON OF INTELL. PROP. (2015), available at http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/The-
Commercial-Value-of-Software-Patents.pdf.
1 7Alice v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
1
sSee, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd, No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 7496140, at *12 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 27, 2014) (Injunction Order).
19Timothy Lee, Software Patents are Crumbling, Thanks to the Supreme Court, Vox (Sept. 12, 2014, 3:50 PM), http:
/ /www.vox.com/2014/9/12/6138483/software-patents-are-crumbling-thanks-to-the-supreme-court; Robert
Merges, Symposium: Go ask Alice - what can you patent after Alice v. CLS Bank? SCOTUSBLoC (June 20, 2014,
12:04 PM), http:/ /www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-
v-cls-bank/; LEx MACHINA, Lex Machina Releases 2014 Patent Litigation Year in Review (Mar. 26, 2015), https:
//lexmachina.com/media/press/lex-machina-releases-2014-patent-litigation-year-in-review/ ("The Alice v.
CLS Bank decision coincided with a dramatic increase in §101 invalidations for unpatentable subject matter.").
2
oLee, supra note 19.
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many companies exist on their patent portfolio alone. 21
In Alice, the Supreme Court held that a patent covering a computerized es-
crow service qualified as ineligible subject matter.22 This case confirmed, as
much as the "non-answer" could, the Bilski holding.23  There, the Supreme
Court held that tying a process to a machine-i.e., computer-was not disposi-
tive, but merely represented one factor in the analysis for determining software
patent validity.24 Alice provides the currently controlling legal framework.
After Alice, the lower federal courts have pursued a more nuanced approach
across the spectrum. For example, in Oracle v. Google, the district court inval-
idated Oracle's Java patents beyond holding in favor of fair use.25 However,
the Ninth Circuit Appellate Court reversed the invalidation and remanded on
fair use leading to another jury verdict in favor of Google.26 Meanwhile, after
several years of contentious litigation, Apple and Samsung will go before the
Supreme Court on the issue of apportionment.27
While some commentators see this as a portent to the end of software
patents, it remains doubtful that the law will change that dramatically.2 8 How-
ever, the courts have and will continue to look at software patents with height-
ened scrutiny. This, inevitably, will lead to litigation in uncharted waters. This
heightened judicial scrutiny also exposes the "behind closed doors" develop-
ment of the law in which the majority of cases are settled outside of court, leav-
ing important questions left to theory.29
B. The Special Challenges Posed by Technology
Modern technology, specifically software, remains largely uncharted territory
for many courts, creating some anxiety for businesses seeking to maximize
their IP portfolios. Throughout history, technological development has often
outpaced its legal corollary. For instance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) was not updated until 2006 to reflect the avalanche of electronic data
in discovery, and even those amendments have become widely regarded as
21See generally INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/ (last visited May 12, 2016); RA-
TIONAL PATENT, http://www.rpxcorp.com/; see also Jeff Roberts, Google paid $4B for patents: why the Motorola deal
worked out just fine, GIGAOM Gan. 30, 2014, 5:15 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/01/30/google-paid-4b-for-
patents-why-the-motorola-deal-worked-out-just-fine.
"Alice v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
2Merges, supra note 19.
24Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
2Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012), rev'd and remanded, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
"Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015); Wingfield
& Hardy, supra note 10.
27Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Samsung Appeal on Apple Patent Award, N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2016),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/technology/supreme-court-to-hear-samsung-appeal-on-
apple-patent-awardhtml" ("Theon Monday agreed to hear an appeal from Samsung on what it must pay for
infringing on part of the design of the iPhone. In, companies including Google and Facebook said the legal
framework governing the design patents at issue was "out of step with modem technology.").
"See discussion supra note 19.
29See generally LAWRENCE LESSIC, FREE CULTURE (2004) (describing how many contemporary media IP matters
involving fair use claims are settled without litigation and judicial explanations that could otherwise provide
predictability and transparency for the community at large).
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insufficient and outdated in the modern era of big data."o Even the most re-
cent 2015 FRCP amendments have already received criticism for not going far
enough to integrate technology.31
However, the difficulty in keeping pace with technological developments
remains an understandable challenge because software is an intellectual prop-
erty, which the law has always struggled to justify philosophically.32 This anal-
ysis is made all the more complicated within the realm of damages and ap-
portionment where several intellectual properties meld together in a product.
When constructing widgets, it is easier for an outsider to see how the pieces fit
together. But software involves an additional step of abstraction that makes it
even more challenging for the uninitiated juror to understand in the context of
a trial.33
The recent smart phone litigation provides an excellent case in point on the
challenges of jury trials in complicated patent matters. Two distinct actions,
Apple v. Samsung and Oracle v. Google, both involved patents that covered smart
phones. Both cases resulted in multiple mistrials and retrials because jurors
"goofed," as prominent commentators described.'
One argument that has been advanced is to simply change the jury system
altogether in patent trials.35 Granted, such claims have a great deal of merit
and should be seriously considered as aspirational goals. However, ultimately
one must remain skeptical of the possibility of meaningfully overhauling such
a monolithic institution as the jury trial. Until that day (if it ever arrives),
consumer surveys represent the best method for educating jurors and making
damage issues easier to understand.
3
0See, e.g., Philip Favro & Hon. Derek Pullan, New Rule 26: A Blueprint for Proportionality Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 933 (2012) (proposing further changes to the amended 2006 rules to
better address discovery challenges raised by large volumes of electronic data).
3 1See Matt Nelson, Does Judge Scheindlin blast proposed FRCP amendments for all the right Reasons? IN-
SIDECOUNSEL (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/09/27/does-judge-scheindlin-blast-
proposed-frep-amendmen ("[Tihe lack of a meaningful dialogue about the role technology and process
play in controlling costs is surprising considering proportionality is the mantra of those advocating for Rule
changes."); Ralph Losey, 2015 e-Discovery Rule Amendments: Dawning of the "Goldilocks Era," EDiSCOVERY TEAM
(Nov. 11, 2015), http://e-discoveryteam.com/2015/11/11/2015-e-discovery-rule-amendments-dawning-of-
the-goldilocks-era/ ("Overall the new Rules will be helpful, especially to newbies, but hardly the godsend that
many hope for.").
32David Franklyn & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself in a World of Others: Towards a Paid-For First Amendment, 49
WAKE FOREsr L.R. 977, 988-996 (2014) (describing the philosophical justifications for intellectual property with
a focus on right of publicity); David Franklyn, The New Federal Anti-Dilution Act: Reinstating the Myth of "Likely"
Dilutive Harm as a Maskfor Anti-Free-Rider Liability, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 199, 199-202 (2007) (describing the
theory behind trademark dilution law and the underlying anti-free-rider impulse).
3David Kohn, The Split: Constitutional and Policy Bases for Establishing Separate Patent Courts, 16 INTELL. PRop. L.
BULL. 115, 121-30 (2012) (discussing the shortcomings and unpredictability of juries in complex patent litigation).
3Pamela Jones, Jury in Apple v. Samsung Goofed, Damages Reduced - Uh Oh. What's Wrong with this Picture?
GROKLAW (Aug. 25, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012082510525390.
35Kohn, supra note 33 at 121 ("My own view is that juries should not be involved in the court system at all
except in the criminal courts, and possibly not even there.").
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C. The Georgia Pacific Factors
Georgia Pacific v. United States Plywood is the seminal case that sets the stage
for the reasonable royalty discussion.36 In this case, the district court developed
the "hypothetical negotiation" test for evaluating patent damages. The test,
more like a protocol, consists of fifteen factors to compute reasonable royalty
damages. 37
The test attempts to evaluate as many variables as possible, including com-
parable rates, previously paid royalty rates, established policies, duration of
the patent, and the relationship of the parties. These factors are more or less
objective and can be argued with focused discovery and fact investigation. But
the other factors are extremely hard to prove, and survey evidence has become
widely used to establish the popularity of a specific feature.38 In addition, the
opinion of expert witnesses exists as its own factor.
D. The Analytical Approach
The analytical approach is the second main avenue to prove damages and in-
volves setting aside many of the contextual factors contained in George Pacific.
Instead of a more qualitative hypothetical negotiation, the analytical approach
relies on quantitative economic forecasting. 39 This approach is favored because
it relies on evidence that tends to have more objectivity and, at this point, has
almost always become the judicial tool of choice.
Traditionally, the analytical approach relied on internal profitability doc-
uments. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) described the
approach in Lucent Tech as "calculating damages based on the infringer's own
internal profit projections for the infringing item at the time the infringement
began, and then apportioning the projected profits between the patent owner
and the infringer." 40
However, this particularly mode suffers from an over dependence on effec-
tive discovery and the existence of such projections. A corporation savvy
enough to create such reports will retain counsel savvy enough to shield
them.4 1
3Methodologies for Determining Reasonable Royalty Damages, FISH AND RICHARDSON, http://www.fr.com/
reasonableroyalty/ (last visited May 28, 2016).
3 7Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.,318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), mod. and affd, 446
F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
38See, e.g., Rembrandt Soc. Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 585, 596 (E.D. Va. 2013), leave to appeal
denied, 561 F. App'x 909 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (showing survey evidence admitted to establish popularity of patented
features); Sentius Int'l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-CV-00825-PSG, 2015 WL 451950, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27,
2015) (highlighting survey evidence admitted to establish popularity of patented features); VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-417, 2013 WL 789288, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2013) (noting particular survey evidence
admitted to establish feature popularity); TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (providing extensive discussion of survey evidence).
39TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F. 2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
4
oJohn Skenyon et al.,Patent Damages Law & Practice § 3:4, at 3-9 to 3-10 (2008).
41See generally Philip Favro, Inviting Scrutiny: How Technologies Are Eroding the Attorney-Client Privilege, 20 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2 (2013) (analyzing legal trends and arguments regarding the oftentimes contentious application of
attomey-client privilege to contemporary electronic evidence).
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Nonetheless, the analytical approach is a more objective and quantifiable
way to establish reasonable patent damages. The challenge remains that such
documentation is rarely available, and therefore must be created for litigation.
To create such evidence requires a large, interdisciplinary team consisting of
economists, statisticians, and data scientists guided by a knowledge legal sub-
ject matter expert. Generally, lawyers serve as experts in the law and not statis-
tical modeling, survey creation, and economic analysis, and therefore typically
hire an outside expert to construct this evidence.
Furthermore, these matters often have tight deadlines-making it even
more challenging for an already overtasked attorney to focus on something out-
side of their realm. Even more so, the stakes are high, meaning fierce scrutiny
from the court plus a dueling witness from opposing counsel. And litigants
tend to argue all aspects of the expert testimony, from credentials to citations.42
These circumstances explain the exponential expansion of survey case law.
In just the past few years, more surveys have been presented than ever before.43
And as the courts accept and interpret more surveys, a growing body of black
letter law has evolved. This section analyzes most of the major survey opinions
and tracks the development of the law from broad and rule-based to bespoke,
fact-based analysis.
III. The Evolution of Patent Case Law Towards Required
Apportionment
Recent case law has created a large deal of uncertainty around patent validity
and valuation, making surveys all the more important and generating a sud-
den influx of survey-based holdings. This section starts with a discussion of
the Lucent Tech and Uniloc cases, two recent cases that set major limits on gen-
eral rules in patent damages. Next, this article analyzes several billion dollar
patent cases involving heavyweight litigants like Apple v. Samsung and Rem-
brandt v. Facebook where surveys were used and discussed in the published
opinion. Because this area of law is still relatively nascent, new opinions and
developments are rapidly developing and the survey issues discussed in this
article will continue to evolve.
A. Introduction to Patent Cases
Patent law can be dramatic. Litigation around modern technology patents es-
pecially creates much uncertainty, as jury verdicts can unexpectedly and sud-
denly transform billion dollar patent portfolios." And that uncertainty is un-
derstandable; the modern design ecosystem has become collaborative and in-
42See, e.g., TV Interactive Data Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d at 1019; Smartflash LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:13-
CV-447-JRG-KNM, 2014 WL 7336213, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014).
43See generally Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 13, at 2029.
"4See discussion supra, note 10.
terdependent, but the patent system has not.45
When dealing with such large damage pools, it helps to have some rules
to go by to prevent the arbitrary invention of figures. But courts have been
narrowing the available rules over the last decade like the entire market value
rule and the 25% rule.6 Under both these rules, litigants could assume that a
patent was worth at least a portion of a known amount. By eliminating these
rules, courts have sought to apply science to the art of damages.
These trends make the role of surveys all the more critical. Consumer sur-
veys, when designed effectively, get to the root of a reasonable value, which
may even be nothing. Surveys are used both offensively and defensively, and
they have different designs accordingly. An offensive survey could prove that
consumers are not willing to pay a thing. Another survey may be designed to
show secondary considerations to establish patentability in the first place.47
B. Pre-Apportionment Surveys: Lucent Tech and the Entire Market
Value Rule
The entire market value rule (EMVR) provides context for the damages ju-
risprudence. Specifically, the EMVR is a damages framework that allows lit-
igants to use the value of an entire product in calculating damages attributable
to individual patented features. This stands in contrast to apportionment,
which restricts the damages framework to only the specifically infringing fea-
tures of a product.
Because the EMVR provides such a broad base for damages, it requires a
high evidentiary showing that the patented feature in question drove or formed
the basis of consumer demand.' 8 On the other hand, the EMVR also provides
a large incentive for parties to invoke it, which means that nearly every patent
damage evaluation will include the EMVR, at least as a tactical consideration.
Indeed, some courts observe a prejudicial impact on the jury just by having
heard the numbers generated in these theories.49
The EMVR remains good law, but has become harder to apply in today's
world of complicated multi-feature products. Many of the following cases deal
with evidentiary deficiencies for generalized data that does not relate to the
specific patent at hand. Where there is insufficient evidence to support appli-
cation of the EMVR, courts will look to evidence that establishes the value of
4 5 TV Interactive Data Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d at 1021 (noting that survey evidence was admitted to isolate and
quantify the value of specific features integrated into a multi-purpose entertainment product).
"See discussion, infra § 3(B).
4 7 Reply Declaration of Dr. Ravin Balakrishnan Concerning U.S. Patent No 8,046,721, Apple v. Samsung, 2012
WL 9504212 (N.D.Cal.) (May 14, 2012) ("My opinion that the'721 patent is not obvious is further strengthened by
secondary considerations of non-obviousness. The discussions in Dr. Vellturo's declaration and reply declaration
discuss such secondary considerations as Samsung's competition with Apple, the iPhone's commercial success,
the marketing of the iPhone using the slide-to-unlock feature, and the consumer surveys pointing to the slide-to-
unlock's usability as afactor in the iPhone's success. It is therefore my opinion that the secondary considerations all
lead to the conclusion that the asserted claims are not obvious.") (emphasis added).
"Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co. Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("We have held that the entire market
value rule permits recovery of damages based on the value of a patentee's entire apparatus containing several
features when the patent-related feature is the 'basis for customer demand."').
49See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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the infringing feature through a process known as apportionment.
In these damage scenarios, consumer surveys provide reliable and fact-
specific evidence on patent values. Surveys can be admitted in these instances
to prove the overwhelming popularity of that a specific feature. A survey
would comprise a powerful evidentiary tool to invoke the EMVR if it could
show that without a specific patented feature, consumers would not even pur-
chase the product in question. A key case on the EMVR is Lucent Tech v. Gate-
way, where the court substantially narrowed its application.5 0
Lucent Tech, like all of the cases discussed infra, involved a software patent
that covered a specific feature integrated into the final product.s" The specific
feature at issue was a software patent that covered calendaring features in Mi-
crosoft Outlook that would automatically populate calendar fields with the ap-
propriate appointments. The initial jury verdict awarded $357,693,056.18 for
infringement based on the EMVR applied to a total of 109.5 million Outlook li-
censes sold during the time period of infringement.5 2 Affirming infringement,
the CAFC nonetheless vacated and remanded on damages, holding that the
key expert had incorrectly applied the EMVR, stating that "[t]his case illus-
trates the difficulty of properly valuing a small patented component, without
a stand-alone market, within a larger program." 53 The court's criticism gener-
ated a large amount of commentary as practitioners observed a shift towards
heightened scrutiny.5
Each party admitted a hypothetical negotiation approach without objec-
tion.55 Microsoft argued for $6.5 million lump-sum royalty whereas Lucent
sought a much higher $561.9 million EMV-based award. 56 Microsoft argued
that its negotiations would have reached a lump-sum payment, because that
structure has the benefit of shifting underreporting risk and ongoing manage-
ment/monitoring.5 7 However, Lucent sought a "running royalty rate."5 In a
lump sum scenario, Microsoft would have paid Lucent much less because the
patent value was speculative. 59 If Microsoft employed a running royalty, Lu-
cent would have the chance to modify-i.e., increase-the rate if the patented
feature proved popular, thereby making a lot more money, roughly $350 mil-
"Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (2009).
5 1Id. at 1301.
52Id. at 1324; see also Daniel Chung, Federal Circuit Vacates $358 Million Jury Award in Microsoft Infringement
Case, FINNEGAN (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.finnegan.com/Publications/federalcircuit/FCCDetail.aspx?pub=
el6ada36-a5f5-4b40-96ff-Ola2flflf2bd.
53Id. at 1336-40.
5Jeff Becker, Lucent v. Gateway and Cornell v. Hewlett-Packard: Signaling Stricter Application of Damage Apportion-
ment Standards in the Federal Circuit, BAKER BOTIs IP REP. (Feb. 2010), http://files.bakerbotts.com/file-upload/
documents/SignalingAStricterDamagesStandardlnFedCirc.pdf; Jeff St. Onge & Bill Callahan, Microsoft Told
to Pay Alcatel-Lucent $1.52 Billion, BLOOMBERG (April 5, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2008-04-05/microsoft-told-to-pay-alcatel-lucent-368-million-over-patent.
s
5 Lucent Tech, 580 F.3d at 1325.
'Id. at 1323 ("At trial, Lucent's theory of damages was based on 8% of sales revenue for the accused software
products, and it asked the jury to award $561.9 million based on Microsoft's infringing sales.").
5 Id. at 1326.
5 Id. at 1338-39.
59Id. at 1326 ("A further, important consideration is that an upfront, paid-in-full royalty removes, as an option
for the licensee, the ability to reevaluate the usefulness, and thus the value, of the patented technology as it is
used and/or sold by the licensee.").
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lion more. 60 Lucent tried to justify the award using previously negotiated com-
parable licenses to establish a reasonable royalty, but fell short because the
patent subject matter in the comparables was not clearly identified. 1
The challenge faced in Lucent represents one that has become a theme in
patent law: isolating the different features and persuasively arguing that the
claimed feature drove consumer demand. Outlook is a powerful software
product with hundreds of features ranging from an electronic address book
to sending email, the actual primary feature. Calendaring comprised a popular
feature, no doubt, but it was, as the court noted, "inconceivable to conclude,
based on the present record, that the use of one small feature, the date-picker
constitute[s] a substantial portion of the value of Outlook." 62 Nonetheless, Lu-
cent convinced the trial jury to use the EMVR and calculate damages based on
the profits attributable to the entire product.
On appeal the CAFC identified two flaws with the EMVR application. First,
the record showed little evidence intimating that the patented feature repre-
sented "even a substantial basis of the consumer demand for Outlook."'6 To be
fair-and most legal professionals reading this can probably relate-Outlook is
packed with features, even at the time, which meant that proving that the date-
picker drove consumer demand was an uphill argument. Second, the expert
did not initially use the Outlook software product as the base for the EMVR,
but rather the entire computer containing Microsoft Outlook.' The expert mod-
ified his opinion at trial, moving from a 1% royalty applied to the combo hard-
ware/software product to an 8% royalty applied to just the software program
without any hardware.s All this despite depositions that showed Microsoft
had not licensed any other features in Outlook, begging the question as to why
they would have licensed this feature in the first place.
The CAFC observed that the EMVR has become the subject of much criti-
cism, noting that "[slome commentators suggest that the entire market value
rule should have little role in reasonable royalty law." 66 But, the court pro-
ceeded, such criticisms "ignore the realities of patent licensing."67
[S]ophisticated parties routinely enter into license agreements that
base the value of the patented inventions as a percentage of the com-
mercial products' sales price. There is nothing inherently wrong
with using the market value of the entire product . . . so long as
the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented
by the infringing component or feature.68
As such, the EMVR, while still technically viable, is an extremely narrow rule
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Lucent Tech failed to prove that the calendar date picker drove demand for Out-
look and therefore could not apply the EMVR. However, this is not to say that
the EMVR is dead. Indeed, one of the first patent orders of 2016 affirmed a
reliable application of the EMVR.69
C. Unitoc, EMVR, and the demise of the 25% Rule
Following up Lucent, Uniloc went a step further in narrowing general rules
available in the patent damage analysis.70 Uniloc not only confirmed the limited
application of the EMVR, but it further invalidated another general damages
rule known as the "25% rule." This judicial shortcut allowed courts to assume
that a reasonable royalty rate for an infringed patent was 25% of the finished
product's expected revenue.71
Of course, the application of the rule was, in practice, much more nuanced
than this simple explanation, and leading commentators have distinguished
the "Classic 25% Rule" against the "25% Rule as a Rule of Thumb." 72 In other
words, in practice the 25% rule simply gave parties a reasonable baseline point
to negotiate out from, taking into consideration different contexts such as mar-
ket and licensing conditions.
Nonetheless, in 2011, the Federal Circuit abrogated the 25% Rule in Uniloc
in very explicit language:
"This court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25
percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for determin-
ing a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation. Evidence
relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus inadmissible under
Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails to tie a
reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue." 73
The plaintiff Uniloc argued that Microsoft had infringed their digital-rights
management software patent. Uniloc developed a patent that effectively pre-
vented "casual copying," the practice of installing licensed software on mul-
tiple machines beyond the terms of the license. Uniloc put forward multiple
damage theories, including the EMVR and 25% rule. On appeal, the court
affirmed infringement but also rejected Uniloc's damages approach, ordering
a new trial on damages.
At trial, Uniloc sought $564 million and secured an initial jury award of
$388 million. Uniloc's expert arrived at that figure by taking the lowest value
for a Microsoft Product Key ($10) and using the 25% rule to establish a royalty
rate at 25% of the value for a Product Key ($2.50).74 In essence, the 25% rule
functioned in this case to create a royalty rate equivalent to 25% of the smallest
69Motio, Inc. v. BSP Software LLC, No. 4:12-CV-647, 2016 WL 105299, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016).
7
oUniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7 1Robert Goldscheider, The Classic 25% Rule and the Art of Intellectual Property Licensing, 006 DUKE L. & TECH.
REv. 1, 4 (2011).
72Id.
73 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315.
74Id. at 1311-12. The $10 Product Key was based on internal documentation obtained during discovery that
set an appraisal range for keys of between $10 and $10,000.
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saleable unit." That royalty rate was then applied to total volume of infringing
products sold (225,978,721), thus generating the $564 million damage claim.
One must note that little exists in the record to ground that 25% royalty rate
in reality. In fact, at trial the expert testified that in his experience, software
royalty rates were "generally above-on average, above 10%."76 No consumer
survey was proffered to establish the value of the DRM feature at 25%. The
expert instead applied the remaining Georgia-Pacific factors to adjust the 25%
royalty rate up or down and concluded that the factors canceled each other
out, thus leaving the 25% rate intact77 Even the trial court observed that the
application of the 25% rule was "perplexing in an area of law where reliability
and precision are deemed paramount."78
The expert then went on to also apply the EMVR as a "check" on the above.
In doing so, he multiplied the total volume of infringing products sold by an
"average sales price per license of $85" for a total of $19 billion.79 The appellate
court again rejected this approach, focusing on a lack of reliable evidence estab-
lishing that the DRM actually drove consumer demand per the EMVR jurispru-
dence. Indeed, it seems rather irrational to suggest that consumers would be
motivated to purchase Microsoft Word, a word processing program, because
of its anti-piracy features. The appellate court certainly observed this, warning
that "[t]his case provides a good example of the danger of admitting consid-
eration of entire market value of the accused where the patented component
does not create the basis for customer demand."8 o
The appellate court not only rejected Uniloc's damages approach, it unam-
biguously abrogated the rule on which they relied. And they further circum-
scribed the application of the EMVR. A key consideration was the lack of reli-
able evidence that could have grounded the calculations in market reality. In
doing so, the court took yet another step toward strict apportionment based on
reliable, scientific evidence.
The Lucent and Uniloc lines make it clear that courts do not favor general
rules of application that oftentimes apply arbitrarily when it comes to deter-
mining patent damages. The 25% rule, abrogated by Uniloc, was described
as "essentially arbitrary" and further criticized for failing to account for the
unique relationship between a specific patented feature and a specific prod-
uct.81 These cases show a trend favoring fact-specific evidence tailored to the
parties, products, and markets involved.
Indeed, for modern products that incorporate hundreds of patents, how
would the 25% rule apply if four independently owned and integrated patents
were found to infringe? For instance, if Uniloc's DRM patent were integrated
75See discussion infra § 3(E)(II) (discussing the smallest saleable unit).76Uniloc at 1312 ("Gemini [the expert witness] then opined that "in my experience, and data I've seen as far as
industry royalty rates for software, which are generally above-on average, above 10% or 10, 11%, I felt that this
royalty was reasonable and well within that range.").
7Id. at 1311 ("At bottom, he concluded that the factors in favor of Uniloc and Microsoft generally balanced out
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into a smartphone OS along with three patents for ancillary features, such as
videoconferencing, data encryption, and the ability to make in-app-purchases,
and each matter was separately adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff, it would
work a result that redistributes virtually all of the profits from the phone maker.
This would be an absurd result for a product like a smartphone because no
rational consumer's purchase decision would primarily rely on those ancillary
features.
D. Laser Dynamics
About a year after Uniloc, the CAFC again rejected an injudicious application of
the EMVR and directly pushed the role of consumer surveys in determining the
appropriate reasonable royalty rate in Laser Dynamics v. Quanta Computer.82 At
trial, the jury found infringement and awarded $52 million in damages, based
on expert testimony applying the EMVR.83 That award was appealed and re-
duced to $8 million at a second trial. On appeal, the CAFC affirmed infringe-
ment but remanded again on damages, reemphasizing that discretion required
in applying the EMVR in multi-component matters, stating, "We reaffirm thai
in any case involving multi-component products, patentees may not calculate
damages based on sales of the entire product, as opposed to the smallest sal-
able patent-practicing unit, without showing that the demand for the entire
product is attributable to the patented feature."84
In this case, Laser Dynamics exercised a software patent that could distin-
guish between different kinds of discs inserted into an optical disk drive-i.e.,
CD vs. DVD.` To determine a reasonable royalty rate, the Laser Dynamics ex-
pert established a royalty rate of 6% for the patented feature based on related
patent licensing programs and a general industry licensing study, apportioned
it to 2%,86 and then applied that rate to the base, which differed depending on
the trial. In the first trial, the entire market value for the infringing product was
applied to generate a $52.1 million damage claim. In the second trial, the value
for a standalone optical disk drive was used to generate a $10.5 million damage
claim.87
The court identified two weaknesses with this approach. First, they held the
rate "arbitrary and speculative"88 and found the base unsupported by the evi-
dence. Second, as for the rate, the court remarked that the 6% figure was largely
based on a general industry licensing survey that was "untethered from the
patented technology at issue" and therefore was "arbitrary and speculative."89





8"Based on his discussions with LaserDynamics' other experts, Mr. Murtha concluded that the patented
technology in the ODD is responsible for one-third of the value of a laptop computer containing such an ODD.
Thus, he arrived at his 2% per laptop computer rate simply by taking one-third of the 6% rate for the ODD." Id.
at 61.
8
7 Id. at 65.
MId. at 81.
196 The Problem of Mop Heads in the Era of Apps jPTOS
Franklyn & Kuhn
The court specifically noted that the most reliable evidence in the record were
actual historical licenses, none of which exceeded $1 million as a lump sum.
This set up a critical standard for the jurisprudence-namely that comparable
licenses must be based on the actual patent at issue.90
The court further criticized the attempt at apportionment by reducing the
6% royalty rate to 2% as "plucked out of thin air based on vague qualitative
notions of the relative importance of the ODD technology." 91 Meanwhile, the
base was criticized as entirely too large and not attributable to the patented
feature:
In this case, Mr. Murtha never conducted any market studies or con-
sumer surveys to ascertain whether the demand for a laptop com-
puter is driven by the patented technology. On the record before
us, the patented method is best understood as a useful commodity-
type feature that consumers expect will be present in all laptop com-
puters. There is no evidence that this feature alone motivates con-
sumers to purchase a laptop computer, such that the value of the
entire computer can be attributed to the patented disc discrimina-
tion method.92
The court went on, explaining further that a persuasive consumer survey that
could support the application of the EMVR would be one that established the
feature as motivating consumers to make the purchase in the first place. Specifi-
cally, it is not enough to show that consumers merely prefer the presence of a
feature to invoke the EMVR.
Laser Dynamics confirmed the trend toward strict apportionment based on
fact-specific evidence, especially as a basic precursor to applying the EMVR. As
the EMVR allows the largest royalty base, it makes reliable surveys all the more
critical. Moving forward in the jurisprudence, more consumer surveys were
admitted for multiple avenues in the patent litigation lifecycle. The next case,
Mirror Worlds, demonstrates the powerful evidentiary impact of a consumer
survey while also highlighting some of the more common criticisms.
E. Apportionment as Rule: The Apple Litigation Saga
Apple, as one of the world's largest technology companies and manufacturer
of the iPhone, is a frequent patent litigant. In fact, one recent survey ranked
Apple as the most frequent patent litigant for 2015.93 As such, Apple stands in
"ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 -F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("By its terms, this factor considers
only past and present licenses to the actual patent and the actual claims in litigation.This court has long required
district courts performing reasonable royalty calculations to exercise vigilance when considering past licenses to
technologies other than the patent in suit.").
91 Laser Dynamics at 70.
92Id. at 69.
93Ironically, the second place champion was Samsung, with whom Apple has been locked in a fierce patent
battle for years. Niall McCarthy, The Companies Sued The Most Over Patents in 2015, STATISTA (Aug. 5,2015),available
at https://www.statista.com/chart/3699/the-companies-sued-the-most-over-patents-in-2015/. See also, Blair
Frank, Chart: Apple, Amazon top list of companies most sued for patent infringement, GEEKWIRE (May 19, 2014, 6:35
PM), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/chart-apple-amazon-top-list-companies-sued-patent-infringement/.
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the top echelon when it comes to savvy litigation strategy. This section walks
through several Apple software patent cases, all of which dealt with consumer
surveys and some of which are still active.
1. Mirror Worlds v. Apple and Uninfringing Feature Creep
As of 2012 the CAFC already had clearly delineated jurisprudence narrowing
the application the EMVR, abrogating arbitrary standards like the 25% rule,
and emphasizing the role of fact-specific evidence. Consumer surveys at this
time began to receive heightened attention in patent trials as a viable eviden-
tiary tool for such fact-specific evidence. In particular, courts focused on iso-
lating the infringing feature value and scrutinized consumer survey evidence
that could bring in value attributable to uninfringing features.
Within weeks of Laser Dynamics, the CAFC again issued another opinion
battening down the requirements for survey evidence, this time focusing on ex-
cising revenues attributable to non-accused features from the revenue base.94
On appeal, the court not only criticized the plaintiff's survey, but also recon-
strued their patent and limited some of the claims, finding non-infringement
as a matter of law and throwing out a $208.5 million jury award.95 Mirror Worlds
places yet another obstruction in front of the EMVR and teaches that patent lit-
igants must properly apportion damages and admit a defensible survey.96
Here, Mirror Worlds exercised a software patent that covered "document
streaming," a program that visualizes chronologically ordered streams of doc-
uments responsive to a user search query. The feature was allegedly integrated
into Apple's Operating System (OS) in three forms. The first feature accused
was Apple's "Spotlight" search, a program that allowed users to search for files
on their computer. The second feature was Apple's "Time Machine" backup,
which displayed backup instances as stacked windows with the latest up front.
The final feature was "Cover Flow," a graphical MP3 navigation interface that
displayed album artworks.
At trial, Mirror Worlds admitted a consumer survey in which "23% of
customers surveyed ranked Spotlight as the '[miost beneficial Tiger [OS] fea-
ture."' 97 They used this evidence to persuade the jury that their patented fea-
ture drove consumer demand, thereby applying the EMVR to Apple software
and hardware. Further, Mirror World's expert claimed that the appropriate
royalty rate was 8.8% on software sales and 0.81% on hardware.98 The jury
returned over $200 million in damages.
On review, the court criticized the survey because it only explicitly asked
about the Spotlight feature, making no mention of Cover Flow or Time Ma-
chine. 99 Therefore the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to
MMirror Worlds v. Apple, 692 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied (Dec. 21, 2012).
95 1d.96
KAREN McDANIEL & RACHEL HUGHEY, PATENT DAMAGES: ARE THERE No MORE 'RULES OF THUMB'?, 2012 MiD-
WEST 11 IPINsT. (2012), available at http://www.minncle.org/attendeemats/77413/77413%20PPT%20HUGHEY%
20MCDANIEL%20003%20-%2OPatent%2ODamages.pdf.
97Mirror Worlds v. Apple, 784 F. Supp. 2d 703, 726 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
98Id. at 726-7.
9Id.
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show that those other features contributed to driving consumer demand.1 00.
Further, the survey only asked respondents to consider the feature in Apple's
Tiger OS, failing to address the subsequent Leopard OS and Snow Leopard
OS.10 ' And beyond that, the survey was "not tied to any of the accused hard-
ware devices" like the MacBook or iMac. The fatal flaw identified by the court
though was that "the surveys cannot simply be translated to encompass Ap-
ple's various hardware, all which have exponentially more features with vary-
ing attributes that are unaccounted for." 102
Taking all these deficiencies into account, the court ultimately held that Mir-
ror Worlds was not entitled to use the EMVR and had to apportion the royalty
base to the specific Spotlight feature.103 Unfortunately for Mirror Worlds, such
an adjustment would prove extremely challenging:
Apportionment cannot be achieved by the mere downward adjust-
ment of the royalty rate in a purported effort to reflect the relative
value of the accused features because doing so fails to remove the
revenues associated with the non-accused features from the rev-
enue base. Thus, Mirror Worlds cannot simply apply "haircuts"
adjusting the royalty rate to apportion damages, and thereby jus-
tify the jury award, because the entire market value of the accused
products has not been shown to be derived from the patented con-
tribution.10
Notice the similarity between this matter and Laser Dynamics, where the court
made a near identical observation on the downward adjustment of the royalty
rate in an effort to further apportion damages.os Here, the court went a step
further in explaining why such a downward adjustment would qualify as arbi-
trary.
Critically, this case had a consumer survey as the focal piece of evidence.
Yet, this case highlights the fact that it is not enough to perform a survey and
submit it, as the court observed here when it noted the weaknesses in this con-
sumer survey. First, the survey only probed consumer demand for one feature
in one product despite multiple features and products in dispute. Second, the
survey failed to appropriately distinguish that feature and isolate its value in
comparison to the bevy of other features contained in the combined software
and hardware. Third, the royalty rate was insufficiently supported by argu-
ment or comparables.
The first issue goes back to the CAFC's refrain on fact-specific evidence.
Consumer surveys must be constructed and administered for each patented
feature. Generally, a single survey can accomplish this. Such features typi-
cally come bundled together and a respondent qualified to provide responses




03 Id. at 727.
14Id.
.15See discussion, supra § 3(D).
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to answer on the related features. But the questions in the survey must remain
distinct and delineated. The questions must adequately probe each feature and
their relative value.
The second issue deals with the overarching challenge in constructing and
admitting consumer survey evidence. Specifically, survey questions must ad-
equately isolate the feature in question to assess relative value. Going back to
Laser Dynamics, it is not enough to show that consumers prefer a product inte-
grating the infringing feature in question to a product without that feature.106
Indeed, surveys ought to include such a question but the ultimate inquiry must
go deeper. Consumer surveys need to strip away ancillary product features,
isolate the infringing feature, and reliably probe consumer demand for that
feature.
The third issue relates inextricably to the first two. Reliable consumer sur-
vey evidence plays a critical role in establishing fact-specific feature demand
and relative value from consumers. Comparables carry substantial weight in
all of these matters, but the CAFC has previously held that such comparables
must involve "the actual patent and the actual claims in litigation."or For in-
stance, back in Lucent Tech the court criticized the comparables as "radically
different" from the instant matter.10 8 While these comparables are admitted,
so long as they are similar in technology and economy, they carry substantially
less weight. In any case, the case law indicates that the sufficiency of a com-
parable is oftentimes a battleground. Thus, it has become a practical necessity
to have expert testimony to explain and relate a comparable to the immediate
matter.109
2. Smartflash v. Apple: The Empire Strikes Back
As soon as Apple overcame Mirror Worlds they faced off against Smartflash
in another software patent case that hinged on the use of surveys and again
successfully mitigated liability. 10
1o"Put another way, if given a choice between two otherwise equivalent laptop computers, only one of which
practices optical disc discrimination, proof that consumers would choose the laptop computer having the disc
discrimination functionality says nothing as to whether the presence of that functionality is what motivates con-
sumers to buy a laptop computer in the first place. It is this latter and higher degree of proof that must exist to
support an entire market value rule theory." LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
toResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("By its terms, this factor considers
only past and present licenses to the actual patent and the actual claims in litigation.This court has long required
district courts performing reasonable royalty calculations to exercise vigilance when considering past licenses to
technologies other than the patent in suit.").
10s"First, some of the license agreements are radically different from the hypothetical agreement under con-
sideration for the Day patent. Second, with the other agreements, we are simply unable to ascertain from the
evidence presented the subject matter of the agreements, and we therefore cannot understand how the jury could
have adequately evaluated the probative value of those agreements." Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
159Joanna Fuller, Patent Damages Law: Life after Lucent, ResQNet, and Uniloc, FEDERAL BAR AssocATIoN (San
Diego Chapter, San Diego, CA), Summer 2012, at 13, available at http://fbasd.org/patent-damages-law-life-
after-lucent-resqnet-and-uniloc/ ("Considering the technological comparability requirement, the panel agreed
that testimony of a technical expert may now be beneficial in establishing license comparability. Indeed, Judge
Huff indicated that such testimony might be necessary.").
n
t
oSmartflash LLC v. Apple, Inc., 2014 WL 7336213 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014).
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Smartflash involved a series of software patents, which covered features re-
lating to renting and downloading media to computer devices including smart-
phones and tablets."' As described in the introduction, smartphones regularly
involve hundreds of patents, and Apple attacked Smartflash's survey for us-
ing ambiguous language, question structure, and failing to properly isolate the
specific feature's value and role in driving consumer demand.1 12
The survey at issue resembles so many that have been discussed already.
It "apportion[ed] the total number of accused units by the percentage of users
who purchased the device because of the accused features.""' The expert then
multiplied that number by average revenue per unit to create the royalty base,
which was further multiplied by the royalty rate for a final damage figure." 4
Here, the fatal flaw lied in the survey design itself that failed to properly ap-
portion contributions of the featured patents and other assets in the device.
The survey asked respondents whether a feature "motivated" them to pur-
chase a device. The court took issue with this question design, holding that
"[aiffirmative responses are insufficient evidence to show that the patented
feature alone motivated survey respondents to purchase the accused devices
because the questions did nothing to distinguish those features as the sole mo-
tivating factor.""' Ultimately, the court only excluded in whole the damage
calculations based on the EMVR, allowing the rest of the survey evidence to go
to the jury for evaluation of weight.116
3. VirnetX v. Apple: The Smaller Smallest Saleable Unit
VirnetX represents perhaps the most dramatic case on patent surveys and cur-
rently stands as one of the largest damage awards ever issued in a patent case.1
At trial, VirnetX won a $368.2 million verdict based largely on consumer sur-





4 To simplify, the survey essentially said the following: Apple sold 100 iPhones at $100 revenue per phone, and
10% of respondents said they were motivated to buy an iPhone because of the patented feature. Therefore the
royalty base is 10 iPhones multiplied by $100 revenue, $1,000. Next, Smartflash would have only licensed their
feature at a rate of 1%; thus the appropriate damage is 1% of $1,000, which equals $10. Of course, Apple actually
sold something closer to 100 million iPhones.
"
5 Smartflash at *3.
11 6 Id. at *4-5.
1
1 7 Decker & Robertson, supra note 12.
"
5VimetX v. Cisco, 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rehearing denied (Dec. 16, 2014); see also Imran
Khaliq & Sean Whaley, You Infringe, So Now What? $368 Million Jury Damages Patent Award Nixed for Fail-
ure to Apportion, ARENT Fox NEWSROOM, (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/you-
infringe-so-now-what-368-million-jury-damages-patent-award-nixed-failure; Frank Angileri & David Berry,
The Federal Circuit's VirnetX Ruling Continues Its Focus On Requirements For Proving Patent Damages, BRoOKS
KUSHMAN (Sept. 30,2014), https: / /www.brookskushman.com/news/client-alerts/the-federal-circuits-virnetx-
ruling-continues-its-focus-on-requirements-for-proving-patent-damages-brooks-kushman/; Jason Rantanen,
Important Damages Opinion: VirnetX v. Cisco and Apple, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 16, 2014), http://
patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/important-opinion-virnetx.html; VirnetX and Microsoft Settle Pending Patent
Disputes and Agree to Jointly Petition to Terminate IPR Proceedings as to Microsoft, VIRNETx (Dec. 19,
2014), http://vimetx.com/virnetx-microsoft-settle-pending-patent-disputes-agree-jointly-petition-terminate-
ipr-proceedings-microsoft/ (settled with Microsoft for $23 million December 19, 2014).
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trial on damages, which then resulted in a $625.6 million verdict." 9 Apple has
appealed again and that matter is currently ongoing.
The portfolio of software patents at issue covered security features of Ap-
ple's iOS FaceTime program and VPN On Demand. Affirming infringement
in 2014, the CAFC nonetheless vacated the $368 million award and remanded
on damages, holding that the key expert had incorrectly applied the smallest
salable unit rule (SSU).1 20
The expert essentially applied a 1% royalty rate to the Apple iPhone, argu-
ing it comprised the SSU. The CAFC rejected this, holding that the expert must
show that the patented feature drove customer demand for the entire phone to
use that as the SSU. For one, the CAFC remanded after construing the claim
as "a direct communication link that provides data security and anonymity."121
This article analyzes the three reasonable royalty theories put forward by Vir-
netX's damage expert and how they relate to the apportionment jurisprudence.
a. VirnetX and the 1% Royalty The first theory presents a straightforward
application of a business practice royalty rate to the revenue of the infringing
devices. The royalty rate was set at 1% based on VirnetX's routine business
practice of seeking license terms for at least 1-2% of the entire value of products
sold.122 This theory sought $708 million using calculations based on the entire
cost of the iOS devices from the $199 iPod touch to the $649 iPhone 4S.123
VirnetX's reasonable royalty calculation applied these at face value, only
taking steps to remove features if Apple already charged extra-for instance,
the optional 32 gigabytes (gb) of memory on an iPhone 4S instead of the de-
fault 16 gb. Thus, features baked straight into the product, like the "touch-
screen, camera, processor, speaker, microphone, and many more," were not
independently accounted for and ultimately factored into the royalty base.1 24
No attempt was otherwise made to apportion software from hardware, "much
less to separate the FaceTime software from other valuable software compo-
nents." 125
This failure to apportion software from hardware became a focal point for
Apple in arguing that VirnetX had improperly applied the EMVR. VirnetX
countered that there was basically no need to excise hardware values from their
calculus because consumers were purchasing the product on the basis of soft-
ware. As their expert testified, "software creates the largest share of the prod-
11 9Joe Mullin, Jury: Apple Must Pay $626 Million to Patent Troll VirnetX, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 3, 2016, 5:49
PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/jury-apple-must-pay-626-million-to-patent-troll-virnetx/
("The verdict form (PDF) shows the jury found Apple infringed on every patent claim that was at issue. The first
question was how much Apple should pay for infringement related to two VirnetX patents that it had already
been ruled to infringe, and the jury held Apple should pay $334.9 million. The panel also found in VirnetX's
favor on other, disputed patent claims, and ordered Apple to pay another $290.7 million for infringing those.The
accused products included Apple's VPN on Demand, FaceTime, and the iMessage service.").
1 20 VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1308.
121 Id. at 1321.
122Id. at 1325.
123Id.
124Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant Apple Inc., VirnetX v. Cisco, 2013 WL 6824182, at *26-27.
125VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1329.
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uct's value." 126 However, Apple turned this argument against VirnetX, argu-
ing that if that were the case the royalty base should have used the cost for the
software upgrade containing FaceTime,1 27 which would have been $29/unit,
as opposed to the $199 iPod. Apple argued that VirnetX had basically applied
the EMVR by failing to separate out hardware and other software features.
b. VirnetX and Nash Bargaining The second and third damage theorems
both relied on John Nash's famous game theory. 128 Nash Bargaining requires
the parties to split between themselves the incremental or additional profits
associated with the use of the patented technology. In the first variation, the
expert focused on "the profits associated with FaceTime from the revenue gen-
erated by the addition of a 'front-facing' camera on Apple's mobile devices."1 29
After reducing VirnetX's split to 45/55 because of a weaker bargaining posi-
tion, this theory sought $588 million.
The Nash Bargaining model used a survey to show that FaceTime "drove
sales" for Apple iOS products, a necessary component to apply the EMVR." 0
To wit, that 18% of all iOS device sales would not have occurred but for the
addition of FaceTime. From that figure he determined profits attributable to
FaceTime according to Nash 1, a 45/55 split. This theory sought $606 million.
The Court did not like any of these approaches. The Nash Bargaining ap-
plication seemed to fail for the reason that it requires a set of assumptions and
premises that are not necessarily fact-specific.13 '
The expert failed to show that the patented feature created the basis for cus-
tomer demand of iOS devices and therefore could not use the EMV:
VirnetX's expert relied on the entire value of the iOS devices as
the 'smallest salable units,' without attempting to apportion the
value attributable to the VPN On Demand and FaceTime features.
... Thus, when claims are drawn to an individual component of
a multi-component product, it is the exception, not the rule, that
damages may be based upon the value of the multi-component
product.1 32
In short, it is only appropriate to use the entire market value where the claimant
can show that the patented feature creates the basis for customer demand or






131"The problem with Weinstein's use of the Nash Bargaining Solution, though somewhat different, is related,
and just as fatal to the soundness of the testimony. The Nash theorem arrives at a result that follows from a certain
set of premises. It itself asserts nothing about what situations in the real world fit those premises. Anyone seeking
to invoke the theorem as applicable to a particular situation must establish that fit, because the 50/50 profit-split
result is proven by the theorem only on those premises. Weinstein did not do so. This was an essential failing in
invoking the Solution." Id. at 1332.132Id. at 1326-28.
13Id.
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such a showing, principles of apportionment apply."134
These strict requirements limiting the entire market value exception
ensure that reasonable royalty "does not overreach and encompass
components not covered by the patent". . . However, the instruc-
tion mistakenly suggests that when the smallest salable unit is used
as the royalty base, there is necessarily no further constraint on the
selection of the base. That is wrong. For one thing, the fundamental
concern about skewing the damages horizon-of using a base that
misleadingly suggests an inappropriate range-does not disappear
simply because the smallest salable unit is used.135
The holding here takes the trend of apportionment one-step farther, from
EMVR to SSU to an even "smaller" SSU. Thus, the court instructs patent lit-
igants that they must further reduce the royalty base beyond the smallest
saleable unit to get closer to the actual value of the individual features them-
selves. This extra step essentially removes from the litigation strategy any op-
tion to use an "off-the-shelf" value to establish the royalty base. In doing so,
it practically sets up a requirement for the use of consumer surveys, and the
court acknowledges as much:
In reaching this conclusion, we are cognizant of the difficulty that
patentees may face in assigning value to a feature that may not have
ever been individually sold. . . . The law requires patentees to
apportion the royalty down to a reasonable estimate of the value of
its claimed technology, or else establish that its patented technology
drove demand for the entire product." 6
Apportionment then is the name of the game. However, curiously, apportion-
ment did not win the day on retrial. Instead, the retrial damages emphasized
comparables: six historical licensing agreements for the technology. From
those agreements, VirnetX's expert distilled average per-unit rates by divid-
ing revenues received by units sold under the license and applied them to end
product revenue. VirnetX and Apple continue to litigate these patents.
F. How Far Can Apportionment Go?
One of Apple's primary arguments as a defendant, in both Mirror Worlds and
VirnetX, has been the inability to properly and completely appraise the isolated
value of infringing software features. In both matters, Apple has criticized
the opposing party for an excessive damage base that failed to properly sep-
arate software from hardware value. This argument is well-suited to situations
where the EMVR is invoked and applied, but its application in the apportion-
ment process poses a worrisome threat of recursion. At some point, it becomes
impossible to fully separate the value of a software feature from that of the
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G. Summary of Apportionment Standards
At first glance the case law mapped out here shows the narrowing approach
to patent damages. Starting from the broadest damage base, the entire market
value of the infringing product, down to the SSU containing an infringing fea-
ture, and then further apportioned to strip away the value attributable to non-
infringing components. And plaintiffs will typically try to hit all the branches
on their way down to apportionment.
However, the conclusion that litigants start at the EMVR and work their
way down to apportionment is misleading. Such a line of logic and reasoning
will only apply to a small minority of products that either comprise a single
component or products in which the patented feature in question drives con-
sumer demand. These situations do not represent the vast majority of patent
litigation.
In actuality, patent litigants should start at apportionment. Even a superfi-
cial reading of the above cases clearly demonstrates that the EMVR represents
"an exception to the rule."13 7 And even when an available SSU exists, litigants
must "further constrain the selection of the base." 138 The point of this is to
reach a damage figure that only compensates the plaintiff for the value of their
patent.
Pulling back the curtain on apportionment reveals a justification and theme
that runs throughout all of intellectual property law. Essentially, the courts
have constructed a logic meant to counter free-riding.1'3 In the absence of such
a strict apportionment regime, patent plaintiffs end up with a damage reward
that goes far beyond the value of their patents. Apportionment stands as a rule
that prevents such windfalls by forcing plaintiffs to establish the value of their
patent alone.
Perhaps the reason that apportionment has only just recently emerged to the
legal foreground is that technology has exaggerated the problem. The techno-
logically complex marketplace has consolidated the value of hundreds of soft-
ware patents into a single product that marries hardware and software. The lit-
igation challenge is disaggregating that value. Failure to properly untangle the
damages works an inequitable result either way as it creates a false dichotomy
between the plaintiff's right to recovery and the defendant's right to a fair dam-
age. But, as the current trend in intellectual property shows, the law tends to
incentivize all or nothing outcomes.14 o The EMVR, and its frequent invocation,
is a case in point.
It remains critical to observe the distinction because this trend absolutely
influences trial strategy. When litigants start from a place of apportionment,
they are not pushed to the back foot when the court inevitably scrutinizes their
EMVR application. And the evidence necessary to argue apportionment, par-
ticularly consumer survey evidence, has become absolutely critical to assessing
1
3 7 Id. at 1327.
1Id.
1
3And this is not an uncommon impetus in IP law. Trademark law is rife with anti-free-rider justification. See
generally David Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in
American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGs L. J. 117 (2004).
140See generally Franklyn & Kuhn, supra note 32.
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the other damage theories. For instance, if a litigant conducted a consumer sur-
vey at the outset of their matter and discovered that the patented feature does
in fact drive consumer demand, the EMVR becomes that much easier to apply.
IV. Survey Best Practices from the Front Line
The takeaway from these cases is that there are no more broadly applicable,
general rules. Apportionment should occur in all cases with damages evalu-
ated case-by-case using specific data. The general rules tend to fail because
they struggle to equitably apply to advanced technological products that inte-
grate hundreds to thousands of patented components. Apportionment allows
courts to take a more nuanced approach and fashion proportional and reason-
able damage remedy.
And yet apportionment actually has existed as a legal device stretching back
to the 19th century and was itself designed for a simpler time. The apportion-
ment analysis contains many factors, some more objective than others. Objec-
tive evidence, like market data and economic analysis, tends to be more de-
fensible and favored. Accurate consumer data on whether and to what extent
specific features drove their purchasing decision is intuitively a valuable data
point for establishing a reasonable royalty. But in many cases, this economic
data critical to apportionment is not discoverable and must be created for the
purposes of trial.
The process of creating data for apportionment can result in conflict. There
are a number of approaches to survey design and ultimately all of them require
some level of skilled lawyering to succeed. Trademark lawyers know this pro-
cess well, and for decades have designed surveys to win their arguments.14 1
Patents, by their nature, require a different approach than trademarks. The
inquiry shifts from brand awareness to feature awareness. And sometimes the
most valuable features, like Java APIs and video codecs, are imperceptible to
consumers. This nature makes it challenging for patent juries to properly ren-
der damages and explains why so many of the cases discussed have been liti-
gated multiple times.
This section attempts to provide guidance on survey design and admission
by analyzing one the most thorough judicial discussions of survey construc-
tion: TVI v. Sony. In that case, TVI retained one of the leading survey experts,
who subsequently engaged in a battle with an opposing expert. Their back-
and-forth brings out some best practices, which this article expands on in sub-
sequent sections.
A. TV) v. Sony: Designing an Effective Consumer Survey
In TVI v. Sony, TVI argued that their patented software, a video codec, was
infringed by a number of Sony products including the PS3.1 42 TVI exercised
141See generally Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 13.
142Beth Winegarner, Jury Clears Sony in $84M TVI Autoplay Patent Dispute, LAw 360 (Mar. 28, 2013, 8:11 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/428429/jury-clears-sony-in-84m-tvi-autoplay-patent-dispute.
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a software patent for "automatically launching an application or other pro-
cess upon the insertion of a disc into a peripheral of a computer system" and
sought $84 million, relying heavily on a conjoint survey."' Ultimately, the
jury invalidated the patent, finding that it would have been obvious at the
time." Nonetheless, this case remains worthwhile because both parties put
forward experts that argued skillfully and the expert report convincingly sur-
vived Sony's Daubert challenge with very little criticism. 145 Importantly, this
expert report contains a very compelling theory based on consumer survey ev-
idence that can be applied to determine the value of a specific patented feature,
isolated from the product that integrates it.
In this case, the plaintiff hired Dr. Srinivasan, an expert in conjoint analy-
sis.146 TVI asked Dr. Srinivasan to design and administer a survey to measure
the market's willingness to pay ("MWTP"). This metric, which has been the
subject of several studies, attempts to quantify the value that consumers place
on a product feature.14 7 The metric "is the amount by which the company can
increase its price yet suffer no reduction in units sold for its product were it
to use [the patented feature] rather than [without] all else the same."1 48 It Can
be used as a proxy for feature value, which in turn directly informs a fair and
reasonable royalty.
The extent to which the experts battled demonstrates the importance that
the parties placed on them. TVI's experts put forward evidence that consumers
would pay up to $10 more for a product that integrated the patented feature.149
And with millions of units sold incorporating the feature, it would comprise a
substantial award.
B. Measuring MWTP with Conjoint Surveys
MWTP represents an ideal metric for apportionment as it measures the mar-
ket's willingness to pay for a single feature.so This is the crux of the apportion-
ment analysis-the worth of a single feature after setting aside other product
features. The MWTP metric measures consumer preferences across different
product configurations that vary different features, including price, and uses
those data points to extrapolate how consumers value different features. For
instance, if consumers express a willingness to pay $10 for a product that lacks
the infringing feature but holds all others equal and $15 for the same product
1old.
144Id.145TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
146"He has authored over one-hundred articles in peer-reviewed journals, including twenty-three on conjoint
analysis."Id. at 1020.In 1978, Professor Srinivasan coined the term "conjoint analysis" in a peer-reviewed article
-that he co-authored with his professor." Id.
1 47Expert Report of Dr. V. Srinivasan, TVI Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., 2012 WL 7040847 (N.D.Cal., May 5,
2012) (hereinafter "Dr. Srinivasan Report") ("Conjoint analysis conceptualizes products as bundles of attributes,
treating price also as an attribute. . . Conjoint analysis uses customer surveys to determine "values" for each
level of each attribute.").
'"Id.
149Id.
'"Declaration of Dr. V. Srinivasan, TVI Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., 2013 WL 496310 (N.D.Cal., Jan. 18, 2013)
(hereinafter "Dr. Srinivasan Declaration").
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with the infringing feature, then the MWTP is between $10 and $15 for that
feature.
Dr. Srinivasan's survey splits into two phases. The first phase ranked the
relative importance of features. The second phase then used conjoint analysis
to quantify the value of those features. Dr. Srinivasan leveraged the Adaptive
Self-Explication of Multi-Attributable Preferences (ASEMAP) method for the
first phase, a method that "yields (statistically) significantly greater predictive
validity to the [other] methods."' 5 ' The ASEMAP method asks respondents to
first categorize hypothetical features of a product, some of which include the
patented feature and variations thereon, into different "buckets." In this mat-
ter, 18 product features were selected for consumers to measure. 152 The respon-
dents then used "an interactive "drag and drop" exercise on the computer" to
rank the relative importance of features within each bucket.' 53 Price discounts
up to $10 were included as features, along with the Autoplay patent and two
non-infringing alternative video playback methods.154 As other cases demon-
strate, the inclusion of a non-infringing alternative is generally quite impor-
tant to defensible survey construction.155 However, there are many situations
where a non-infringing alternative either does not exist or cannot be readily
identified.5 6
In the second phase, conjoint analysis is used in the survey and respon-
dents are asked to choose their preference for one of four different product
configurations. Each configuration included five product features. Of the five
features, three were chosen from the buckets in Phase 1 and the other two were
price discount and the attribute of interest, namely the infringing attribute.15 7
Respondents were presented with fifteen choice sets of varying features and
price discounts.
Across the hundreds of respondents, these surveys produced several thou-
151 Dr. Srinivasan Report, supra note 150.
152 Id. ("(i) Categorize the 18 features into two "buckets", the more important nine, and the less important nine.
(ii) By using an interactive "drag and drop" exercise on the computer, the respondent ranks features within each
of the two buckets from the most important to the least important. At the end of step (ii) we have a rank order of
all 18 features in terms of their importance.").
1 5 3 Id. ("It is sufficient to ask 13 strategically-placed pair comparison questions to get accurate results (average
error less than 5%).").
1
s
4Id. ("For instance, Blu-ray players have several attributes, e.g., Built-in WIFI, Video Noise reduction, Sur-
round Sound, Next disc playback, and Price discount. Each of the attributes has levels, e.g., Surround Sound:
yes, no; Next disc playback: playback after 15 seconds, playback after 40 seconds, playback after 90 seconds;
price discount: $0, $5, $10. Alternatively the attribute of interest, Next disc playback, has two levels: Automatic
playback, Enter file name to start playback.").
1 55 See also Lisa Cameron, Michael Cragg, & Daniel McFadden, The Role of Conjoint Surveys in Reasonable
Royalty Cases, LAw360 (Oct. 16, 2013, 6:37 PM), http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/
004/948/original/TheRole Of ConjointSurveys InReasonableRoyaltyCases.pdf?1382111156 ("The con-
sumer's WTP for an infringing feature depends on what noninfringing alternative products exist. If such al-
ternatives exist, the survey expert must assess the degree to which consumers prefer the infringing alternative
to the NIA. Thus, the conjoint survey should include noninfringing levels of the relevant attributes unless the
plaintiff can credibly argue that there are none.").
'5s1d. ("Of course, one common area for dispute among plaintiffs and defendants is whether there is an accept-
able NIA available to consumers and if so, what the degree of consumer acceptance of that alternative would
be.").
15 7Id. ("Each option was described by its level on each of the set A (or B) of three attributes, the attribute of inter-
est, and price discount. The choice sets chosen by CBC's varied across respondents. The order of presentation of
attributes was randomized across respondents, but the order was fixed across choice sets for each respondent.").
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sand data points, enough to identify the relationship between features and
price. Dr. Srinivasan's conjoint survey showed that the MWTP for the infring-
ing feature ranged from $7.61 to $10.158 "This means that Sony could have in-
creased the price of its Blu-Ray players by at least $7.61 and still kept the same
unit sales level by using Autoplay rather than reboot."1 59
C. Apple v. Samsung: Using Consumer Surveys to Quantify Demand
Beyond establishing a patented feature's monetary value, consumer surveys
can also establish consumer demand, either to invoke the EMVR or to shape the
royalty base. The court formally approved such a use in Apple v. Samsung.160
Further, the survey did so in an innovative way, by measuring the decrease in
consumer demand for products containing a work-around for the infringing
features.
Apple and Samsung's smartphone litigation consumed patent practition-
ers for years as the parties cross-claimed each other on dozens of issues re-
lated to their competing smartphones. The case is currently pending before
the Supreme Court on the very issue of apportionment. Here, this article fo-
cuses in on one specific heavily litigated issue-consumer surveys as empirical
evidence establishing consumer demand
Apple initially commissioned an expert to conduct a conjoint consumer de-
mand survey to quantify the MWTP. The survey was very similar to that in TVI
because qualified respondents, who all owned the infringing Samsung phone,
were asked about their preferences in regards to different smartphone product
configurations to ascertain feature values. Then the survey went one step fur-
ther in an effort to measure consumer demand for the entire product by asking
consumers whether they would purchase a Samsung phone without certain
patented features.
The survey presented four different product configurations at a time with
"varied price, camera features, call initiation and screening features, input as-
sistance features, screen size, and data accessibility features of hypothetical
smartphones."161 The survey asked respondents to assume all other features
not mentioned, like battery life, were equal.162 The preference selection went
on for sixteen rounds, each with four different configurations to choose from,
until respondents had selected sixteen total configurations.
In addition, the survey collected further data points by asking the
respondents-after they had made their preference selection from the limited
universe-whether they would purchase that cellphone in light of other smart-
15Id.
1591d.
160"In light of these studies in the relevant field of marketing research, the Court finds that Dr. Hauser's general
methodology, using a choice-based conjoint survey to quantify decrease in demand for the product absent the
patented feature, is sufficiently reliable to survive Daubert scrutiny because Dr. Hauser's methodolegy is sub-
stantially similar to those employed in these studies." Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK,
2014 WL 794328, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014).
...Id. at '13.
1621d.
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phones on the market, including other Samsung smartphones.1 63 Respondents
were incentivized to provide their true preferences by a one in twenty chance
to win a free smartphone based on their selections. 6 4
The survey evidence answered two important questions at trial, specifically
(1) how much are consumers willing to pay for the patented features and (2)
how many Samsung smartphones owners bought their phone because of the
patented features. This secondary inquiry allowed Apple's expert witness to
"quantify the proportion of customers Samsung would have lost if its smart-
phones did not contain the patented features at issue in that case." 165
This evidence was constructed by designing a matrix for willingness to buy
that measured how many consumers would be willing to purchase phones at a
certain price with a certain screen size. The baseline matrix measured willing-
ness to pay for a smartphone with all features. That matrix was then compared
with models that extrapolated out market willingness to pay when one of the
five claimed features was missing. The difference between the baseline and the
hypothetical constituted the percentage of market demand driven by that fea-
ture. The tables in Appendix 1, reproduced from the expert's report, visualize
this difference.1 66
The survey data quantified, based on reliable evidence, the percentage of
consumers motivated to purchase products based on the infringing features.1 67
Further, the calculations contained enough granularity to identify specific fea-
ture differences and quantify how their absence would influence consumer de-
mand.168 The expert ran analysis on each feature's influence individually and
taken together. He found that when all five of the patent-related features were
removed, consumer willingness-to-buy dropped by 43%-74%.169
The district court admitted this evidence over multiple objections from
Samsung, ultimately holding that the objections went to weight and not ad-
missibility. This evidence is crucial in invoking the EMVR. It could be reason-
ably argued that if consumers are 74% less willing to purchase a smartphone
'63d. at *14.
1
6 4 An excellent practice pointer to observe-always endeavor to select the most relevant and appropriate survey
incentive. Id. ("To provide a further incentive for respondents to make choices consistent with their true pref-
erences, respondents were told that 1 in every 20 survey takers would be selected to receive a free smartphone
based on the winning respondent's survey choices and, if the smartphone offered was priced at less than $300, a
cash award equal to the difference.").165id.
166Tables at Appendix 1.
1
6 7Cameron, Cragg, & McFadden, supra note 155 ("For example, if the researcher seeks qualitative information
about how much consumers value the infringing level(s) of the attribute at issue, he can develop a conjoint survey
that provides that average or median consumer WTP, as Apple's expert did in Apple v. Samsung.").
'6Expert Report of John R. Hauser, Apple v. Samsung, No. 5:12-cv-00630 (ECF 1182) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014)
at PP116 (hereinafter "Expert Report of John R. Hauser") ("For example, as seen in Tables 6 and 7 above, the
baseline share for a smartphone with a screen size of 4.8" and a price of $199 (and other features) is 72%. The
but-for share for the same smartphone without the Background Syncing patent-related feature is 64%. In this
example, the absence of the Background Syncing feature lowers willingness to buy by 8% (8% = 72% - 64%).
Another way to present these results is to say that the change in the share is 11% (11% = (72% - 64%) + 72%).").
1691d. at PP121. ("Scenario 1 evaluates the decline in willingness to buy resulting from the simultaneous removal
of all five of the patent-related features included in the smartphone survey: Background Syncing, Quick Links,
Universal Search, Missed Call Screen Management, and Automatic Word Correction. The resulting percentage
decline in willingness-to-buy ranges from 43% (for 5.0" or 5.5" smartphones at $49) to 74% (for 4.0" smartphones
at $299).").
without certain features, then those features substantially drive consumer de-
mand. Of course, it is ultimately a question of fact for the jury to determine ex-
actly how much consumer demand those features influenced. But either way
this evidence remains incredibly useful and furthermore compelling. Even if it
fails to invoke the EMVR, it nonetheless provides empirical data points to help
establish a reasonable royalty base.
D. Rembrandt v. Facebook: Consumer Surveys Must Actually Mea-
sure Feature Demand
Mathematically, there are two ways to arrive at the value of X, where X is the
value of one specific feature in a multi-component product with non-infringing
features Y and Z. One way involves measuring the value of X. The other way
measures the value of the other features Y and Z and subtracts those from the
aggregate. The law has a problem with this latter approach because, prac-
tically speaking, it is rather challenging to reliably measure and remove all
non-infringing feature values. For one, how can the court be sure that all non-
infringing features have been taken into account? In Rembrandt v. Facebook the
court was faced with just such a survey.170
There, Facebook was sued for alleged infringement of two patented fea-
tures: "BigPipe" and "Audience Symbol." This case presents a rather unique
product, as it was not a licensed software product like Microsoft Office or a
consumer hardware product like Apple's iPhone. Instead, Facebook's product
consists of the entire social media website that attracts billions of users mon-
etized mostly through advertisements. The "BigPipe" patent was a backend
feature that enabled faster data transfers and the "Audience Symbol" patent
was a set of icons that visualized privacy controls.171
The plaintiff expert calculated the royalty base by starting with the EMVR
and then applying two apportionments. However, it remains critical to observe
how the district court wrote about the features in the opinion, which was up-
held on interlocutory appeal:
Next, he excluded 50% of the total revenue stream, as representing
the amount of revenue attributable to the use of Facebook's nonin-
fringing mobile applications. Next, on the basis of customer and
advertiser surveys used to rank the importance of twenty-one fea-
tures of Facebook, he excluded the amount of revenue attributable
to features not causing Facebook to infringe. He did not attempt to
determine the revenue attributable to the BigPipe and Audience Sym-
bol. 172
The court upheld the process of starting with the EMVR and apportioning it
down broadly but ultimately found fault with this methodology of further ap-
170The author was a testifying expert in this case.
171 U.S. Patent No. 6,415,316 & U.S. Patent No. 6,289,362.
172Rembrandt Soc. Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 585, 591-92 (E.D. Va. 2013) (emphasis added).
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portioning the base based on the value of everything but the specific features.173
The court's specific language revolves around using surveys to measure non-
infringing values and "exclude" them from the EMVR. This process, the court
observed, led to an inflated damage figure that incorporated the value of non-
infringing features.1 74
The Rembrandt case shows that the most reliable surveys are those that actu-
ally measure the specific patent features. The holding in Rembrandt casts doubt
on the approach of the sculptor-it is not enough to chip away everything that
is not the specific patent and hold the remainder up as attributable entirely to
the specific patent.
To be sure, there are situations where it is reliable and proportional to mea-
sure in the inverse, but those situations are probably limited to smaller multi-
component products where fewer features drive consumer demand. Rembrandt
teaches that a consumer survey must be able to apportion value to the infring-
ing feature. It is not enough to identify and isolate values for non-infringing
features and then assume that whatever is left is attributable to the infringing
features.17 5
E. Apple v. Samsung lll: Using Consumer Surveys to Establish Patent
Validity
Consumer survey evidence played another critical role in Apple v. Samsung's
third appeal. In this very recent order, the CAFC focused on the role of con-
sumer surveys as secondary evidence of nonobviousness for patent validity
purposes. There, the CAFC reversed a $120 million award in Apple's favor
and upheld a $158,000 award in Samsung's favor.1 76 The Court held that a sub-
set of Apple's patents, including most of the ones that were previously sur-
veyed, were either obvious or not infringed. Specifically, "Slide-to-Unlock"
('721 patent)177 and "Automatic Word Correction" ('172 patent) 78 were in-
validated by the CAFC as obvious. 179 Beyond that, the court affirmed non-
infringement for "Universal Search" ('959 patent)18 0 and "Background Sync-
'
7 3 d. at 594. ("In order to determine the revenue actually attributable to Facebook's use of the invention, Mr.
Malackowski needed to apportion further.").
1741d. ("Rembrandt claims that its expert calculated damages, as the Federal Circuit requires, down to the
smallest salable patent-practicing unit, and thus apportioning any further is impractical and unnecessary. This
argument is unpersuasive. Awarding Rembrandt damages based on the revenue stream attributable to Timeline,
News Feed, Groups, and Photo/Video Sharing would award Rembrandt much more than "the use made of the
invention by the infringer.").
'"
5 d. at 595. ("Similarly, allowing Rembrandt's expert to use as the royalty base the entire value of Timeline,
News Feed, Groups, and Photo/Video Sharing-all of which can be used independently without infringing-
while not using the value of BigPipe and Audience Symbol-the features that actually cause the alleged
infringement-would be a mistake of the same kind as allowing Rembrandt's expert to use the entire value
of Facebook.").
176Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2015-1171, 2-3 (Fed. Cir. 2016), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1171.Opinion.2-24-2016.1.PDF" (hereinafter "Apple Ill").
'"U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721.
'
7 U.S. Patent No. 8,074,172.
17Apple III at 3.
1sU.S. Patent No. 6,847,959.
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ing" ('414 patent)' and further reversed a finding of infringement on "Quick
Links" ('647 patent).1 82 The CAFC removed all but one of the patents evalu-
ated in the consumer survey from the equation by holding or upholding them
as invalid or uninfringed.1'8
In this immediate analysis, consumer survey evidence was less about estab-
lishing a reasonable royalty and more about establishing patentability through
secondary evidence. This is a critical distinction to make-what follows is not
necessarily an indicting of consumer surveys for damages, although there is
certainly a lesson to be learned in that respect. Instead, this specific commen-
tary from the CAFC goes to using consumer surveys to establish patentability
by way of secondary evidence showing commercial success.
This vector is based on a Supreme Court opinion, Graham v. John Deere.'
There, the Court established three factors that could serve as evidence of
nonobviousness beyond the inventions.1 s5 These "secondary considerations"
include: (1) commercial success; (2) long felt but unsolved needs; and (3) fail-
ure of others.' 86 Turning to the role of consumer surveys in the Apple matter,
the CAFC observed:
The survey evidence indicates that consumers were more likely to
purchase smartphones with automatic correction than without au-
tomatic correction. However, the survey evidence does not demon-
strate whether a consumer would be more or less likely to buy a
device with the specific combination of features reflected in claim
18 of the '172 patent as opposed to, for example, the Robinson prior
art. 187
The CAFC poses a challenging, but certainly not impossible, obligation on con-
sumer demand surveys to go further and compare and contrast the patented
feature in question with the prior art.188 The court criticized Apple's survey for
failing to compare consumer demand between the specific patent and two spe-
cific prior arts presented by Samsungl 89 : Robinson ('730 patent) & Xrgomics.1 90
Those patents in combination set out an autocorrection feature that the court
said was identical to Apple's.1 91 Because the survey failed to measure Apple's
patent's consumer demand in relation to the prior art's consumer demand, it
i1 U.S. Patent No. 7,761,414.
182U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647.
183Missed Call Screen Management ('760 Patent) was the survivor.
18Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the





1 7Apple III at 34.
1
ssId. at 35 ("Apple's evidence shows that phones with autocorrection may sell better than phones without
autocorrection, but it does not show that phones with the specific implementation of autocorrection embodied
by claim 18 sell better than phones with other methods of autocorrection disclosed by the prior art.").1
s9"Samsung presented two pieces of prior art that it contends together teach every limitation of the claimed
invention." Id. at 31.
190Id. at 32 ("As both parties agree, Robinson thus discloses every aspect of the invention except displaying and
replacing an incorrectly typed word in a first area (in context).").
191 d. at 33 ("The combination of Robinson and Xrgomics results in Apple's invention.").
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provided an incomplete analysis. As a result, the consumer survey evidence
was insufficient to establish consumer demand and the CAFC attributed it no
weight.19 2
In principle, it would be straightforward to design such a consumer sur-
vey. The survey must ask the broader demand questions to establish a reason-
able royalty, but establishing commercial success for nonobviousness requires
a different inquiry. If Apple's survey had included additional questions that
very clearly set out the differences in their patent versus the prior art and mea-
sured consumer preferences, that would have gone a long way to satisfying the
CAFC. But the questions could be as straightforward as asking respondents to
rank relative preferences between the different patented features.
One challenge is that the CAFC indicated that Apple's patents were nearly
identical to the prior art, which is largely why they were invalidated. So, pre-
sumably, the consumer survey data would not have shown much of a difference
in terms of feature preference. However, in situations where the prior art is not
so identical, consumer surveys could offer compelling data.
For instance, Apple argued at trial that the patents differed in that they
made auto-corrections at different times.193 Apple's autocorrect feature auto-
matically enters a correction when users hit the space bar. A potential con-
sumer survey question could have been something along the lines of, "Do you
prefer your smartphone's autocorrection functionality to make corrections as
you type or only after you affirmatively accept suggested corrections?"
V. Constructing a Survey
Having reviewed the key cases on damages, survey construction, and defensi-
bility, several themes guide practical survey construction. Patent judges have
made clear that apportionment is the starting place for all software damage
matters. Only when empirical evidence shows that a feature substantially
drives demand will the EMVR apply. And the EMVR is far from dead letters;
indeed this article reviewed several recent cases where the EMVR was applied
based on consumer survey evidence.
Another theme of the cases is measuring features in relation and isolation
to other features. In terms of damages analysis, surveys need to isolate the in-
fringing feature's value from that of the non-infringing hardware and software.
Meanwhile, at least in terms of secondary evidence for validity, the infringing
feature needs to be evaluated in relation to the value of the prior art. This sec-
tion will highlight some of the primary practical issues with consumer surveys.
A. Constructing a Survey: Tactical Pretrial Considerations
Designing, administering, and admitting a consumer survey to establish patent
damages is not a hobbyist venture and the decision to go down that route must
be a tactical litigation choice. Surveys are extremely powerful tools, even if they
'
92 d. at 35.
193
"There is no dispute that autocorrection features were known in the prior art." Id. at 30.
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are never used at trial. And indeed, previous researchl 94 has found that many
trademark lawyers commission surveys that are never even submitted in litiga-
tion.195 These lawyers indicated that consumer surveys provided the necessary
data to advise their clients on whether to settle or litigate. 9 6 In patent litigation,
a pre-trial survey that indicates an infringing feature drove consumer demand,
thereby opening up application of the EMVR, would be an even stronger in-
centive to launch a lawsuit. Alternatively, knowing data points regarding con-
sumer preference for the infringing feature provides reinforcement for favor-
able settlement terms.
And the tactical considerations go beyond settlement evaluation. A proper
consumer survey requires lead-time to design and administer. So having a con-
sumer survey underway in advance adds pressure to the other side throughout
the pendency of litigation, especially in "rocket docket" jurisdictions like the
Eastern District of Texas.
Another finding from previous trademark consumer survey research shows
that when one side submits a survey, it generally pushes the other side to sub-
mit a survey as well. An unopposed survey typically exerts more influence
than an opposed one, particularly where it is opposed by similar empirical ev-
idence.197
All told, consumer surveys can serve a variety of needs and should be de-
ployed strategically. At the pretrial stage, surveys inform negotiation and plan-
ning. Litigants that have conducted a survey have empirical data at their dis-
posal that is rarely available otherwise and provides a strong knowledge ad-
vantage. Knowing that different features command different demand levels
can be used to argue damages and even validity.
B. Constructing a Survey: Respondent Selection, Alignment, and
Population Size
Cultivating and aligning the survey respondents plays a critical role in proper
survey design. If the survey respondents are not familiar with the products
or features in question, their responses are not as useful in the patent context.
Respondents that have experience with the product or product type are more
likely to be representative of the consumers whose opinions matter the most.
For instance, in the Apple v. Samsung cases, survey respondents were chosen
based on whether they owned Samsung phones. Further, if the respondents
are not incentivized to provide accurate data, then the results may be circum-
spect. In the Apple v. Samsung the respondents were offered a chance to win a
smartphone based on their responses.
194While this research deals with consumer surveys in trademark law, it is very analogous to the issues in patent
law.
195Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 13 at 2052-54.
196The research indicated that of the trademark attorney respondents who had commissioned a consumer sur-
vey, only 19.2% presented the survey at trial. Id.
1971d. at 2055 ("Attorneys faced with an opposing survey see themselves at risk if they do not have empirical
evidence to counter the opposing party's survey results. Our results from attorneys reporting on their most recent
case provide some evidence that an unopposed survey may be more influential than one that is opposed.").
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Finally, the survey needs a sufficiently large pool of participants to draw a
reasonable inference based on an acceptable confidence interval. The popula-
tion size will vary depending on the facts of the matter and the needs of the
survey. In many of the reported cases, the MWTP figures were based on less
than a thousand respondents. 198
However, the surveys that are used must be appropriately filtered-MWTP
calculations should not be based on all completed surveys. Commonly, experts
will apply two levels of screening criteria to filter out unreliable and unhelpful
survey responses. The first slice of criteria looks at logistics: Did the respondent
complete the survey in a reasonable time period and provide genuine answers?
The second slice of criteria looks at the facts of the case and the needs of the
survey to further focus on the most relevant consumer groups by asking: Did
the respondent own the product in question or the category of product? In
some cases, it may be necessary to exclude more than 90% of the respondents
on screening reasons. 199
C. Constructing a Survey: Framing and Question Design
When designing a survey for patent damages, a useful technique is to start
with the end in mind to frame the ultimate purpose of the survey and design
the appropriate questions.20 0 The end goal of a standard survey is typically to
provide objective benchmarks as to the consumer demand and, ultimately, the
monetary value of specific patented features. But, as the cases discussed show,
different goals necessitate different survey questions and designs.
If the goal of the survey is primarily to establish secondary evidence of con-
sumer demand, the purchase-motivation questions ought to be framed in a ref-
erence to the prior art. Likewise, where the goal is damages the questions need
to be framed such that they appropriately isolate and apportion the value in re-
lation to non-patented features. However, multiple goals can go hand-in-hand
in terms of survey construction and design; it is possible to create one survey
that appropriately answers a range of patent related questions from validity to
value. When consumer motivation is quantified and established empirically, it
provides a defensible and compelling data point for the ultimate royalty calcu-
lation.
To the extent feasible, one ought to conduct pre-testing to ensure that the
questions probe the right features necessary to appropriately measure the de-
mand and value of the specific infringing features. Generally, consumers can
only effectively weigh a handful of features at once-the best practice is to fo-
cus on six or seven features. 201 However, in many complex situations it is im-
198 For instance, in TVI v. Sony the MWTP calculations were based on data obtained from 969 respondents split
into three different products of roughly 300 respondents each. Dr. Srinivasan Declaration, supra note 150 at 8. In
Apple v. Samsung, the MWTP was based on over 671 completed surveys for one product. Expert Report of John
R. Hauser, supra note 168, at 293.
'9Expert Report of John R. Hauser, supra note 168 at 293 (5.7% of surveys were completed and survived all
criteria filters).
2
0STEPHEN COVEY, THE 7 HABrrs oF HIGHLY EFFECTrVE PEOPLE (Simon & Schuster ed., 2013).
201 Compare Cameron, Cragg, & McFadden, supra note 155 ("In fact, extensive experience with conjoint surveys
has shown that consumers cannot make effective decisions that involve weighing more than seven attributes")
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possible to narrow the feature sets down that much and there are defensible
examples where as many as 20 features were evaluated.202
To get around this restrained scope, surveys may ask respondents to hold
all other features equal or constant.203 This disclaimer finds its way into vir-
tually all of the surveys in one form or another. However, lingering concerns
remain that consumers may not be consistent in their understanding of what
this means. 204 For instance, not all phones have a voice-command assistant like
Apple's "Siri." 205 When an Apple iPhone owner responds to a survey that does
not have a voice-command assistant as a specific feature, they could potentially
impute that as a standard feature and incorporate it into their value judgment
whereas other smartphone owners would not.20
To this point, it may be helpful to demonstrate a product at the start of the
survey as a baseline with a set of industry-standard generic features. It is im-
portant to indicate and identify the major features that are being held constant.
There are variety of ways to do this depending on the structure and model of
the conjoint survey at issue.
D. Constructing a Survey: Direct Elicitation Surveys
Next, choose the appropriate type of survey-there are some instances when a
conjoint survey does not represent the best tool to use. An alternative format
is direct elicitation. In a direct survey, the designer asks the respondents about
a product feature directly, i.e., "On a scale of 1-5, how important is [patented
product feature]?" Direct elicitation gets to the heart of the matter quickly, but
has several criticisms and limitations.207 The first is honesty-when asking a
with Dr. Srinivasan Report, supra note 150 ("A challenge in using CBC in the current context is that there are 20
DVD player attributes; if we include all 20 attributes in each of the choice sets, there would be an information
overload on the respondent leading to fatigue and poor quality data, and the advice in conjoint literature is to
keep the number of attributes down to six or fewer.").
202Id.
203 See, e.g., Dr. Srinivasan Report, supra note 150 ("Assume that all other features of the DVD players shown to
you are the same.").
204Cameron, Cragg, & McFadden, supra note 155. ("Theoretically, the choice of attributes should not have a
significant impact on the results because respondents are told to hold all other attributes constant. However,
consumers may hold different views on which attributes are being held constant.").
205"Talk to Siri as you would to a friend and it can help you get things done - like sending messages, placing
calls, and making dinner reservations. You can ask Siri to show you the Orion constellation or to flip a coin.
Siri works hands-free, so you can ask it to show you the best route home and what your ETA is while driving.
It works with HomeKit to let your voice be the remote control for connected products in your home. And it's
tuned in to the world, working with Wikipedia, Yelp, Rotten Tomatoes, Shazam, and other online services to get
you even more answers. The more you use Siri, the more you'll realize how great it is. And just how much it can
do for you." iOS- Siri-Apple, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ios/siri/ (last visited May 28, 2016).
206 See, e.g., Dr. Hauser's Expert Report, supra note 168 (every product configuration included this as "all other
features on your most recent Samsung smartphone.").
207Joel Steckel, Rene Befurt, and Rebecca Kirk Fair, Is It Worth Anything? Using Surveys in Intellectual Property
Cases,THEANALYSIsGROUP(2013),availableathttp://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/
publishing/aipla-white-papersteckel_03-11-13.pdf ("If one were to ask this consumer directly whether longer
battery life is important to her, she would likely answer yes. If one were to present her with a scale from one to
five and were to ask her to rate the importance of battery life, chances are that she would rate the importance at
five; that is "very important." If one were to ask the same direct question regarding the importance of weight,
one would likely get similar answers. According to the preferences of our exemplar consumer, lightweight is
important and chances are that she rates this characteristic also as "very important." We can leam two things
from this: either all features are equally important, or asking direct questions leads to answers that do not reveal
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consumer such a direct question they may have their guard up or they may be-
lieve that there is a "correct" answer. The second is awareness-they may not
even be conscious of their purchase motivation. 208 Such psychological phe-
nomenon can theoretically influence the results of direct elicitation, although
little legal commentary exists to show how this impacts the integrity of evi-
dence. -
Direct elicitation comprises one of the more straightforward methods for
collecting consumer preference evidence, but in modern software patent dis-
putes it cannot be applied universally. There is an even greater risk in this
specific context that consumers may not understand the complex feature in
question or that the question structure could mislead them. For instance, we
would expect that asking a general consumer directly how much they value
VPN technology in their smartphone would yield a low valuation. But if asked
how much they value security, the results would increase. Appropriate framing
is therefore paramount for direct elicitation.
The challenge.remains crafting a question that relates the extremely compli-
cated patented subject matter to conmon vernacular. And this all presupposes
that the consumer has the capability of consciously assigning such value. In the
trademark context, this is known as "sophistication" and carries with it a set
of presumptions-the more expensive the product, the more feature-conscious
the consumer will be.209
E. Conjoint Analysis and Indirect Elicitation
Most of the surveys discussed in the case law have been conjoint surveys that
leverage indirect elicitation. As the namesake implies, indirect elicitation asks
consumers questions about their preferences without directly or overtly draw-
ing a connection with a specific patented feature. Indirect elicitation is typically
considered more reliable. 210 In one part, this is because consumers are caught
with their guard down through misdirection. 211 The question may ask one
thing to measure another.
In another part, indirect elicitation may prove more reliable because it can
abstract, disguise, and relate a complicated product feature better. The down-
side though is that indirect elicitation surveys are more complicated to design
and require more expert knowledge. However, advances in research software,
the true preferences of the consumer. Not surprisingly, most market research scholars and professionals believe
the latter.").
2
osJed Friedman, Being Indirect Sometimes Gets Closer to the Truth: New Work on Indirect Elicitation Surveys, THE
WORLD BANK (Sept. 26, 2012), http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/being-indirect-sometimes-gets-
closer-to-the-truth-new-work-on-indirect-elicitation-surveys.
209See generally AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
21
oCameron, Cragg, & McFadden, supra note 155 ("Conjoint surveys enable us to obtain information about the
choices people make and the drivers of their behavior in a more reliable way.").
21Dr. Srinivasan Report, supra note 150, at *5 ("More accurate measurement is likely to be obtained with an
indirect method of questioning in the presence of other attributes. The intuition is that we catch the customer
with his/her guard down.").
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such as Sawtooth212 and Asemap,213 have made it much easier to design reliable
indirect elicitation surveys. These programs can present a series of "bundled"
features comprising a product and ask the respondent to choose the one they
would be most likely to purchase. The respondent is presented with several
rounds of product assemblies and as they make choices different features begin
to acquire discrete value assignments. Reliable, objective data then coalesces
around individual product feature valuations.
In a conjoint survey, respondents are presented with a series of product
configurations composed of a handful of features and asked to indicate which
product they would prefer to purchase. Price is included as a feature and is
generally present across all the product configurations. However, the price will
typically vary across the product configurations. In addition, the infringing
features are included along with either workarounds or prior art as needed.
Respondents will typically make at least a dozen selections to generate data
points that are aggregated together to evaluate how much each product feature
contributes to the product value.
For instance, imagine that respondents must choose smartphones based on
feature combinations and price. If the respondent indicates that she would pay
$25 more for a smartphone with the infringing feature but not $50 more, and as-
suming all other features are equal, then the conjoint analysis would show that
the infringing feature has a value somewhere between $50 and $25. The tech-
nology available today can provide much more thorough and complete value
analysis based on consumer preference data. In many of the expert opinions
analyzed above the software was able to pinpoint MWTP to the penny.
F. .Constructing a Survey: Measuring Demand and Value
The ultimate goal of the survey is to empirically quantify the demand and mar-
ket value of the infringing feature to establish a reasonable royalty. A survey
should be conducted to learn how the features in question impact market de-
mand to make a plausible attempt at invoking the EMVR. Since the EMVR re-
mains a high-risk, high-reward royalty base, data on apportioned value needs
to be at the ready in case the EMVR ultimately fails. All of the apportionment
case law has shown that courts want a survey to produce a focused figure that
has close ties to the specifically infringing patent. That figure must appropri-
ately separate and exclude the values attributable to. non-infringing software
or hardware features. And where the data is used to establish consumer de-
mand for secondary evidence of patentability, the survey should go further
and additionally identify the relative consumer preference compared to prior
212Survey Software & Conjoint Analysis - Sawtooth Software, SAWTOOrsH SOFIWARE, http://www.sawtoothsoftware.
com/ (last visited May 27, 2016). The Apple v. Samsung survey specifically relied on Sawtooth. "Specifically, Saw-
tooth Software, which produces the software that Dr. Hauser uses to conduct the analysis of the choice-based
conjoint surveys in the instant case, notes that in choice-based conjoint surveys, "[bly selecting the [outside] op-
tion, a respondent can contribute information about the decrease in demand tobe expected if, for example, prices
of all offered products increased or the products became unattractive in other ways." Apple, Inc. v. Samsing
Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 794328, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014).
213ASEMAP, https://www.asemap.com/ (last visited May 27, 2016).
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art. Surveys need to evaluate infringing features in three ways: (1) consumer
demand, (2) willingness to pay, and (3) in relation to prior art.
Measuring consumer demand represents the standard, baseline function
of a consumer survey. It is the broadest data point, establishing the volume
of consumers that prefer a feature. It may be used to invoke the EMVR by
showing that infringed features substantially drove consumer demand for a
multi-feature product. Typically, the consumer demand serves as a preference
or volume metric, as opposed to a dollar metric.
Evaluating market willingness to pay is where the survey connects prefer-
ences with economic analysis. It goes the next step, asking consumers not only
if they prefer a feature but also the worth of that feature. This is an important
nuance because a large majority of consumers may prefer to have a patented
feature, but they may not attach significant economic value to that feature.
In the context of damages, this IWTP should be calculated in a way that
excises any value attributable to un-infringing hardware or software. One way
that this is applied in practice is by setting up a hypothetical for the respondent
with the disclaimer "assume all other features are the same." This way, at least
theoretically, respondents are only responding to the incremental value of the
features in question.
This challenge to completely isolate the infringing feature's value raises a
recursive problem. Practically every software patent could be said to rely on
hardware to some extent, whether it be the phone or a cloud server that is host-
ing an application. But the argument could easily become reductio ad absurdum
where the value of the processor or computer chip could be said to contribute to
the value of the software running on it. So to completely excise the value of the
hardware in that way seems an impossible task. Instead, the focus should rest
on separating hardware to the extent that it provides a significant competitive
market advantage.
For instance, a consumer would attach very little value to smartphone
video-conferencing software if the smartphone itself lacked a camera. And, if
that camera was poor quality it would, presumably, reduce the value that con-
sumers otherwise attached to video-conferencing. Likewise, if a smartphone
had a specially developed front facing camera and marketed that feature heav-
ily, one would expect consumers to place a higher value on the combination
of infringing software and hardware and a survey would need to go to greater
lengths to isolate the impact of the specially developed hardware.
Practically speaking, the context of the trial should provide some guidance.
In the situation of competitors suing each other, e.g., Apple v. Samsung, the
consumer survey could simply include another set of questions with a variable
on the different hardware, such as iPhone camera vs. Galaxy camera. Over-
lapping features and identical hardware would otherwise be eliminated. For
instance, if a video-conferencing app had been in question in Apple v. Samsung
then the existing survey could have proposed an additional matrix to compare
consumer preference's for the hardware cameras used in the different phones.
Meanwhile, in the situations where a NPE is suing a manufacturer, e.g.,
VirnetX v. Cisco, the survey would need to be direct with the respondents. For
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example, it could ask them directly to evaluate their willingness to pay for the
feature with a 0.3-megapixel camera, a 2-megapixel camera, or a 5-megapixel
camera.
VI. Macro Trends & Their Predictive Measure
The question on everyone's mind: How low can apportionment go? With-
standing the prior judicial history, the macro trend of allowable damages has
narrowed in scope, from the largest unit-the entire market value-honing in
upon the SSU, and then arriving at the apportionment paradigm. Within ap-
portionment, courts have instructed parties to go even further by conducting
analysis to not only identify the value of the infringed feature but to take further
steps to remove any potential free-riding on un-infringing features.
It is hard to imagine a jurisprudence that continues to slice valuations even
further. Nor does it seem abundantly clear what benefit further apportionment
would have in relation to the complexity and cost necessary to carry out such an
analysis. That said, courts will not slide backwards and relax their evidentiary
standards. Consumer surveys have undoubtedly risen in popularity in just the
past few years. The surge in judicial commentary started in 2009 with Lucent
Tech and has trended upward ever since then. Courts will admit more surveys
in the future to deal with the complex challenges of software patents and the
cases reviewed here in this article will form the foundation of case law.
Surveys provide extremely valuable data that gets to the core of the royalty
analysis. In many situations no data exists that reliably answers the question of
consumer demand and willingness to pay for a specific feature. And with the
way that surveys can be customized and designed to probe for different con-
figurations, they perfectly suit the courts' demands to isolate infringing feature
values.
Survey technology has made it possible to obtain empirical data that ob-
jectively measures consumer demand and willingness to pay for patented fea-
tures. This kind of analysis was never available to the Garretson court faced
with the challenge of the mop-head. Even then, they nonetheless challenged
litigants to provide damage figures that reliably apportioned feature values.
Only now, 130 years later, does the technology exist that reasonably enables
this inquiry on a broad basis and it should be used to the fullest extent possi-
ble.
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VII. Appendix 1
Screen Size
Phone Price 4.0" 4.8" 5.0" 5.5"
$49 72% 83% 90% 88%
$99 70% 82% 88% 86%
$149 63% 76% 83% 81%
$199 58% 72% 80% 77%
$249 52% 66% 75% 72%
$299 46% 59% 68% 65%
Table 1: Baseline Willingness to Buy for Smartphones with All Features
Table 2: But-for Share for Smartphones with All Features Except Background
Syncing
Screen Size
Phone Price 4.0" 4.8" 5.0" 5.5"
$49 64% 77% 86% 83%
$99 62% 76% 84% 82%
$149 55% 69% 78% 75%
$199 50% 64% 73% 70%
$249 44% 57% 67% 64%
$299 38% 51% 59% 57%
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